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For the past decade or so, important aspects of American tort
law have sought to reaffirm tort's ostensible commitment to
individualized justice. In the courts, "the elephantine mass of asbestos
cases"' has produced a reaffirmation of what Justice Souter in Ortiz v.
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Fibreboard Corporation called the "day-in-court ideal": "our deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court."2 The academy, in turn, appears to be in the midst of a
sustained revival of the closely related idea that tort law consists in
the reciprocal relationship between plaintiff and defendant, in which
the bipolarity of the dispute forms the heart of the tort system's
aspiration for corrective justice. 3 "Tort law's structural core," writes
Jules Coleman, for example, "is represented by case-by-case
adjudication in which particular victims seek redress" from particular
defendants, each of whom "must make good her 'own' victim's
4
compensable losses."
Underlying these resurgent aspirations to individuation in the
law of torts is, among other things, a common set of assumptions
about the character of our "historic tradition," as Justice Souter put
itnoted in Ortiz.5 At conference after conference, in article after
article, that tradition is said to be grounded in a purportedly longstanding American commitment to individualized justice.6
To be sure, sophisticated observers of the legal system
understand that the overwhelming majority of cases settle long before
an adjudication ever takes place. Yet the literature on tort settlements
-inspired by Mnookin and Kornhauser's seminal article in the field of
domestic relations 7-adopts an individualized approach to thinking
about bargaining in the shadow of the law. Settlement theorists have
shown the deep significance of repeat-play agents in non-zero-sum
fields like commercial litigation and negotiations among commercial
comments on earlier drafts. Chris Brummer, Camden Hutchison, and Megan Renfrew provided
excellent research assistance.
1.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)
2.
Id. at 846.
3.

ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 63-66 (1995).
4.
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 16 (2001).

5.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846.
6.
See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003);
John C. P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2034 (1997); John C. P. Goldberg, Reconstructing Liberalism Rights and Wrongs,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1828 (1999) (reviewing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE

LAW (1999)); Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 381 (1992);
Stephen R. Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283 (2003);
Stephen R. Perry, Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757 (2002) (reviewing
COLEMAN, supra note 4); Stephen R. Perry, The Distribution Turn: Mischief, Misfortune, and
Tort Law, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 315 (1996); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof Tort
Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003).
7.
Lewis Kornhauser & Robert Mnookin, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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entities, or in the non-zero-sum aspects of matrimonial law.8 But
there has been relatively little consideration of the role of repeat-play
specialists and of the phenomenon of aggregation in tort settlements. 9
Our question here is whether the description of American tort
law that underlies recent case law and scholarship adequately
accounts for the resolution of tort disputes in American law, either as
a matter of historical, tradition or as a matter of present reality. 10
Have tort cases really taken the individuated form that tort jurists
like Justice Souter and Coleman and settlement theorists inspired by
Mnookin and Kornhauser suggest? Indeed, can tort law in its current
institutional form look the way the literature and the cases seem to
indicate?
In our view, the individualized justice accounts overlook a
powerful counter-tradition in American tort law. Mature torts-by
which we mean torts that over time develop repetitive fact patterns
and
repeat-play
constituenciesl -- have
persistently
resolved
themselves into what are essentially bureaucratized, aggregate
settlement structures. "Informal aggregation," as Howard Erichson
12
has called it, is not the deviation but the norm in these cases.
8.
See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Ronald J. Gilson, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperationand Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 534-547 (1994).
We set to one side the interesting and relatively new literature on the collective social norm
shaping effects of legal norms. E.g., WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN

LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the
Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003); see also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (giving an intriguing study, along these lines, in the law of
torts).
9.
Important exceptions include Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The
Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859 (2002); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997);
Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers and their Clients: Settlement Expectat8ions,
Settlement Realities, and Issue of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 795 (1998); and Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
183 (2001).
10. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Non-Party Preclusion,67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) (laying out a project that adopts a different approach to a similar end).
11. We adapt our "mature torts" category from Francis McGovern's well-known work on
"mature mass torts," meaning torts that have generated "multiple jury verdicts" and have
demonstrated "persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions." Francis E. McGovern, Resolving
Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989). Our category of "mature torts" is
dramatically broader than McGovern's "mature mass torts" in that it extends McGovern's
category to those torts that regularly give rise to stereotyped fact patterns for resolution by
repeat players, even those involving different actors and occurring at different times. Further,
we focus more directly on the role of tort litigation in establishing a pricing mechanism for
stereotyped fact patterns, regardless of whether the triggering events are typically thought of as
mass harms.
12. Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
CoordinationAmong Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386-409 (2000). Our project
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Moreover, it almost always has been. Indeed, since the very
beginnings of U.S. tort law, a variety of aggregate settlement
institutions have powerfully shaped the resolution of particular cases
in some of the most important fields of tort practice.
To a large extent, we seek merely to remake an insight that
informed the initial development of the law of torts but seems to have
been significantly forgotten. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., developed his
early view of the law of torts around cases of isolated individual
injuries with the classic bipolar structure. The case of Brown v.
Kendall, in which one man struck another with a stick while
separating two fighting dogs, 13 was thus the paradigm case for the
still-emerging theory of tort law he articulated in The Common Law in
1881.14 Fewer than twenty years later in his "Path of the Law"
address of 1897,15 however, Justice Holmes had come to view
American tort law as organized not around chance interpersonal
encounters, but rather around the apparently inevitable onslaught of
injuries thrown off by the progress of industry.16
Accordingly, in this Article we adopt a descriptive approach
very similar to those adopted in prominent work in both the economics
and the corrective justice literatures. In the former, Richard Posner's
classic study of the law of negligence began with descriptions of
reported negligence cases. 17 In the latter, moral philosophers have
drawn their accounts of tort law from the practices of tort jurists.
Indeed, the philosophers of tort law may even be said to have
in this paper is to expand Erichson's claim that the conventional understanding of "a neat line
between class and non-class litigation ... misses important aspects of what happens in modern,
large scale, non-class litigation." Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty
and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 524
(2003). In Erichson's account, mass litigation in recent decades is often "handled through
collective representation even if no class is certified." Id. at 524-25. Our point is that even from
long before recent mass-tort cases, mature tort claims processing was carried on through
collectivized aggregate institutions.
13. 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
14.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 84-85 (1881).

15.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).

16. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 7-8 (2004) (describing the transition
in Justice Holmes's thought); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 109-43 (1992) (contending that Justice

Holmes in his "Path of the Law" address abandoned his earlier search for an immanent morality
in the common law in favor of the positivist separation of law and morals for which Justice
Holmes is now famous); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 346-47 (2002) (showing the
role of probabilistic thought in shaping Justice Holmes's intellectual environment in the postCivil War period).
17. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (1972); See
Kornhauser & Mnookin, supra note 7 and accompanying text (similarly grounding their article in
a description of the changing face of divorce settlement negotiations).
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successfully wrested the use of description in tort law away from the
economists. Coleman's most recent book on the subject, to take only
one prominent example among many, is expressly organized around
an account of tort law that he claims best embodies the "concepts that
organize our torts practice,"1 8 concepts that are sometimes (as the
corrective justice scholars take great glee in noting) difficult to square
with economic principles. 19
Where Judge Posner looked to appellate court opinions and
where Coleman looks to "case-by-case adjudication," however, we focus
on institutions for the resolution of tort disputes that have sprung up
outside the courthouse and outside the reported decisions. Standard
histories of civil litigation purport to trace a long-term decline in the
aggregation of civil claimants in which late-medieval and earlymodern group litigation gave way to individualized claims. 20 In our
view, by contrast, the decline of earlier group litigation has given rise
to a tort system characterized in mature torts by a new set of
distinctly modernist aggregating institutions and practices. The
replacement for pre-modern group litigation has not been
individualized claims adjudication but rather privatized mechanisms
of settlement that take classes of claimants as aggregates and develop
mechanisms for the settlement of claims at the wholesale level rather
than at the retail level.
Important aspects of American tort practice, in other words,
are characterized by the same kinds of institutionalized and
bureaucratic modes of authority Max Weber identified in other
modern social and economic institutions. As Weber observed a century
ago, such institutionalized bureaucratic modes of authority have often
emerged in the private sphere as well as in the public sphere. 2' The
difference--and this is perhaps why academics and courts alike have
failed adequately to recognize it-is that the private systems of
aggregation in our tort system exist in a far-flung, decentralized, and
under-the-radar world that rarely comes to the attention of tort
jurists. Indeed, the Weberian irony is that tort law's ostensible
commitment to individual litigant autonomy seems inevitably to
18.

COLEMAN, supra note 4, at xv.

19. See Stephen R, Perry, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Standard, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 893, 897-98 (2001); Perry, Comment on Coleman, supra note 6, at 382-83; Zipursky, supra
note 6, at 755-56; Benjamin Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1, 70-73 (1998).
20.

STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS

ACTION (1987); see also Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving
the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987)).
21.

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 982-83 (1968).
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produce settlement markets in tort claims characterized by
22
aggregating bureaucracies.
At least two normative claims follow from the institutional
countertradition of American tort practice, one in the domain of
substantive tort law, the other in procedure. 23 First, the bureaucratic
aggregation of our tort practice calls into question the individualized
accounts of tort practice that are increasingly influential in the
corrective justice literature. Multiple traditions, as political scientist
Rogers Smith has put it in a parallel context, 24 have long
characterized the practices of American tort law. In particular,
systems of private aggregate administration (existing alongside our
claimed tradition of individuation) have resolved the overwhelming
majority of mature torts claims and continue to do so today. Our goal
here is not necessarily to revise substantive tort law in those outlier
cases that actually go to trial. Instead, we seek to describe the place of
these litigated outcomes and their doctrinal offspring within the
institutions of American tort law.
Second, our focus on aggregation reorients the U.S. Supreme
Court's concern over mass tort class action settlements. Tort
settlement classes in recent years have come under especially acute
fire as inconsistent with the purportedly traditional approach of
individualized inquiries and corrective justice. In our view, however,
the class action cases that have drawn such extensive judicial and
22. Weber's parallel point was to note the ways in which the forces unleashed by private
enterprise were contributing to the bureaucratic rationalization of modern social life. MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 67-69 (4th ed. 1952). To put it in

the slightly different terms inspired by Robert Kagan's work on adversarial legalism, our claim is
that with respect to mature torts, the American preference for adversarial legalism over public,
hierarchical bureaucracy often results in private systems of informally aggregated settlements
that bear a closer resemblance to public compensation systems than Kagan allows. The contrast
that Kagan and others observe between public hierarchical bureaucracies and privatized
settlement (though important) may thus be less stark than it has been understood to be. ROBERT
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 125 (2001) (explaining that the

U.S. has a "political tradition that is mistrustful of bureaucratic authority-preferring to
fragment authority and hold it legally accountable through individually activated rights and
adversarial litigation"); THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 7 (2002) (describing the American constitutional

tradition as distinctively organized around adversarial litigation).
23. Some of what we say in this article will come as no surprise to specialist readers. The
tort literature has long noted the ways in which settlement practices coexist with the formal law
of tort such that, as an empirical matter, relatively few cases actually go to trial. H. LAURENCE
ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 232-34

(1980). Nonetheless, as one insurance company lawyer noted decades ago, personal injury
settlements remain "the stepchild of law schools and of the legal profession." Lawrence E. Carr,
Jr., Settlement of PersonalInjury Cases, 9 FOR THE DEF. 43, 43 (1968).
24. Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in
America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993).
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scholarly scrutiny - cases like Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor 25 and
Ortiz v. FibreboardCorporation2 6 --are not so much departures from
the normal workings of tort law as they are points along a continuum
of aggregating devices that have long characterized tort practice in the
area of mature torts. 27 Indeed, in those areas in which repeat players
on the claimant and defense side have institutionalized aggregating
practices for claims resolution, the American law of torts looks much
like an opt-out class action tort suit. Tort claimants may opt out of the
aggregate settlement structures and into individualized justice, but
only at great cost and with long delays.
Class actions, to be sure, are considerably more transparent in
their aggregation, more formal in their claims resolution processes,
and more coercive in their compelled association. But class actions lay
bare a process that exists below the surface of judicial scrutiny in tort
28
settlement markets characterized by repeat-performance specialists.
Indeed, as Judge Posner has recently observed, in some cases alleging
mass wrongs, the absence of aggregation should be more troubling
than its presence. 29 The difficulty raised by cases such as Amchem
and Ortiz, we will conclude, thus has less to do with the day-in-court
ideal than with the problem of ensuring fairness in aggregate
settlements that (a) replace markets in claims representation with
monopolistic class representation; and (b) pose firm-killing liability
risks, often with long-tail time horizons.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF REPEAT PLAYERS AND AGGREGATED
SETTLEMENTS

The attention to tort law's apparent attachment to resolution of
harms asserted between individual victims and individual tortfeasors,
25. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
26. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
27. A stark "inherent tension" does not necessarily exist, as the Court put it in Ortiz, 527
U.S. at 846, between representative class suits and the day-in-court ideal. Moreover, although
distinguished observers have rightly noted the powerful novelty of the modern era of mass torts,
see, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 941, 945-47 (1995), there are also powerful continuities that connect the
modern mass tort to the historical traditions of American tort practice.
28. Class actions have taken the place of private settlement administration where: the
small value of the claims in question inhibits private economies of scale, there are limits on the
funds from which claims may be collected, and the future claims are of unknown and possibly
large dimensions.
29. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 288 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing risks of
collusion when lawyers purport to settle cases without representing significant numbers of
affected clients); see also Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification,
Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1042, 1060-61 (2004).
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though increasingly significant in the past few years, is hardly a new
phenomenon. For almost as long as there have been tort jurists, they
have described "individualism" as a primary value of Anglo-American
tort law. 30
In the view of many tort lawyers, "The principles
embedded in tort law ... constitute a fundamental aspect of liberal
31
individualism."
Even a cursory examination of the formal doctrine of the law of
torts calls such claims into question. Common law tort doctrine has
long adopted what we may call doctrines of substantive aggregation in
tort. Consider the familiar choice--pervasive in the law of tortsbetween rules and standards. Tort law has traditionally been shot
through with liability-limiting rules that cut off the inquiry into tort
law's basic reasonableness standard. 32 In these areas of tort doctrine,
as Frederick Schauer has recently noted, the choice of rules over
standards is effectively a choice to adopt a one-size-fits-all ruleeffectively aggregating the individualized details of whole classes of
cases-over a standard of "reasonableness" or "negligence" that may
33
be tailored to the particular circumstances of an individual case.
Indeed, if we simply take the rules/standards choice, the practical
commitment of American tort law to individualized inquiries-as
opposed to the stylized rendition of tort law by tort theorists-is at
best only a relatively recent and partial trend as some of the liabilitylimiting rules of late-nineteenth-century tort law have given way to a
relatively pure negligence standard. 34
30. See, e.g., Francis Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 14-15
(1906); Daniel Polisar & Aaron Wildavsky, From Individual to System Blame: A Cultural
Analysis of Historical Change in the Law of Torts, 1 J. POL'Y HIST. 133, 146-47 (1989). See
generally J.M. Balkin, Too Good to be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw (1987)) ("[T]here is a clear analogy between individualist attitudes
toward economic regulation and tort duties.").
31. Zipursky, supra note 6, at 754.
32. Special limited- and no-duty rules, for example, cut off tort suits against landowners
and occupiers, product manufacturers, charitable enterprises, family members, employers, and
many other categories of defendants. Other rules have long limited tort plaintiffs' ability to bring
actions for pure economic loss or negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Robert L. Rabin,
The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle:A Reinterpretation,15 GA. L. REV. 925, 948-54
(1981) (discussing pure economic loss and negligent infliction of emotional distress as examples
of cases outside the ambit of fault liability).
33. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 104-05 (2003).
34. Even then, this trend toward deciding landowner and occupier cases, for example, or
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases under the reasonableness standard is one that
many think has come to a halt over the past decade or so. We may, in other words, be witnessing
the reemergence of tort doctrine's long-standing tradition of aggregating particular cases for
collective, one-size-fits-all resolution. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End
of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 620-23, 684-90 (1992). Indeed,
notwithstanding the long tradition of claims by tort jurists to the contrary, negligence rules and
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We could go on in this vein for some time. Many of the
ostensibly individualized doctrines in the private law of tort adopt
what are effectively aggregating strategies.3 5 In this paper, however,
we want to make a different point. Our goal here is not to describe the
substantive aggregation provisions in tort doctrine, but to focus on the
long-standing tradition, and indeed the inevitability, of procedural
aggregation in the law of torts.
A. The Beginnings of Tort in Mass Industrial Harm
For all the attention American tort lawyers show for their
field's individualist traditions, it is a standard observation among
historians that the doctrinal field of Anglo-American tort law arose
out of the mass harms thrown off by mid-nineteenth-century
industrialization. As Lawrence Friedman has put it, "The modern law
of torts must be laid at the door of the industrial revolution, whose
36
machines had a marvelous capacity for smashing the human body."
To be sure, a smattering of personal injury cases arose out of trespass
and (later) trespass on the case going back to the early days of the
English common law writ system. 37 But bringing together the
procedural forms of action of the writ system under the umbrella of a
field called torts was a distinctly modern move, arising out of the shift
from the writ system to code pleading and out of the new pressures of
other liability-limiting provisions in the law of tort are not necessarily any more individualized
than strict liability rules or liability-expanding provisions. To be sure, from the ex post
perspective, long favored by common lawyers, a choice not to reallocate accident costs from
plaintiff to defendant is a choice plausibly described as consistent with individualism: ex post it is
a choice to favor individual self-reliance over collective responsibility. But ex ante, the choice
between letting accident costs lie where they fall or reallocating them through the law of torts is
better described not as a question of whether to adopt an individualist approach but as a
question of how to strike one of several equally individualistic accommodations among competing
interests: one that protects victims' individualism against harms caused by doers, or one that
protects doers' individualism against the inhibiting force of others' claims in their individualism.
See Roy Kreitner, Insurance at the Crossroads: Nineteenth Century Law and the Appropriation
of Risk, Presentation at the Annual Conference of the American Society for Legal History,
Washington, D.C. 12 (November 2003) (on file with authors) (noting that "the conception of
absolute individual rights ...arose at the same time with the increased popularity of insurance
attitudes ...
[and] the attitude of embracing risk was already an important element of late
nineteenth century expansion of insurance institutions"); see also Robert Rabin, Some Thoughts
on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1193-94 (1996) (noting that
negligence and strict liability have each been supported by both corrective justice and collective
justice principles).
35. Cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law'
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849, 855 (1984) (advocating the expansion of
aggregating approaches to the ostensibly private law of torts).
36.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985).

37.

See 1 MORRIS ARNOLD, SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS, 1307-1399

(1985).
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industrialization. 38 The first significant English-language treatise on
torts, for example, appeared only in 1859. 39 More than a decade later,
Holmes famously complained that "Torts is not a proper subject for a
law book." 40 Nonetheless, a flurry of successive editions and competing
volumes followed, all seeking to keep up with what leading torts jurist
Thomas Cooley called the ever "more frequent controversies"
accompanying the "new inventions and improvements" of the machine
41
age.
For many observers, the most extraordinary feature of the new
law of torts was the speed with which the dockets became crowded
with personal injury cases. 42 Contemporaries estimated that personal
injury suits in urban areas increased by as much as 800 percent over
the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a claim which
historians have essentially confirmed. 43 As one awe-struck member of
the New York State Bar Association explained in 1897, "Negligence
claims are blocking our calendars with a mass of litigation so great as
to impede administration in all other branches of law." 44 George
Fisher has recently even suggested that the growth in personal injury
cases at the turn of the twentieth-century was so great that it had
ripple effects across American law, placing pressures on court time
that fundamentally altered the processing of cases even on the
45
criminal side of the docket.
Importantly for our purposes, substantial-and probably
growing-parts of the new personal injury docket consisted of cases
brought against large industrial concerns whose operations were the
source of what is plausibly described as the first American mass tort
dilemma: the inevitable cascade of injuries sure to arise out of

38.

See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001).

39.

FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS (1859). One earlier work

has escaped the attention of many tort historians (including one of us): "a little book which has
for its title on its spine 'Torts and Wrongs,' " which Professor Milsom describes as having been
published in 1720. S. F. C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUDS. 1, 6 (1981). The volume's obscurity (it is not catalogued by the Library of Congress or
any other U.S. research library) supports the general point. Moreover, Milsom notes that the
volume was not at all a treatise in the nineteenth-century sense but rather a "detached bit of
abridgment" cataloguing medieval and early modern decisions concerning such actions as trover.
Id.
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Note, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing C. G.
ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1870)).
41.

THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE

INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT) 1 (Chicago, Callaghan 1879).
42. WITT, supra note 16, at 59.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining'sTriumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867-68 (2000).
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industrial enterprises. In New York City, for example, work injuries
accounted for 21 percent of all personal injury lawsuits in 1890 and 27
percent in 1910.46 Across the country, in and around Oakland,
California, "Common carrier accidents dominated the personal injury
docket," with a few major players attracting substantial shares of the
personal injury lawsuits. 47 As Lawrence Friedman and Thomas
Russell have observed, by 1904 the court clerk in Alameda County
Superior Court was regularly using a rubber-stamp with the words
48
"Southern Pacific" on it rather than writing the words by hand!
Institutional repeat-play tort defendants constituted the
beginnings of defense-side organization in the personal injury bar. By
the turn of the twentieth century, defendants' lawyers in personal
injury litigation routinely handled significant numbers of personal
injury claims. 49 Railroad attorneys in particular began to organize
and coordinate their strategies, holding conferences at which they
shared information and developed tactics for fighting off employee
injury litigation. The first "railroad attorneys' conference" was held in
1906 in Louisville, Kentucky to discuss the possible effects of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act on railroad employers' liability
litigation. 50 Further conferences followed in Atlantic City in 1908 and
5
elsewhere, and the organized defense bar was born. '
A specialist plaintiffs' bar and its associated ranks of runners
and claimants' agents of a variety of different kinds also began to
develop, though it was severely underdeveloped as compared to the
lawyers on the defense side. 52 Commentators sympathetic with
defendants were the first to identify the plaintiffs' bar. "Barratrous
speculat[ors]," growled jurists like the New York Court of Appeals's

46.

RANDY BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK, 1870-1910 21

(1992). Work injuries' share of the personal injury docket was considerably smaller than their
proportion of the total number of accidental injuries in the United States at the time, which has
been estimated at between one-third of all accidental deaths and one-half of all disabling
injuries. See WITT, supranote 16, at 27, 240 n.141.
47.

Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs, 1987 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 351, 361.

48. Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D. Russell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury
Litigation, 1901-10, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 299 (1990).
49. 42 percent of defense lawyers in one sample handled ten or more personal injury cases.
BERGSTROM, supra note 46, at 97.
50. WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN
THE NEW SOUTH 226-46 (1999).

51. Id. On the litigation and settlement tactics of the organized defense bar, see Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., PrivateLaw and Social Inequality in the IndustrialAge, in PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL
INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 505-35 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000).

52. BERGSTROM, supra note 46, at 97 (finding that only 7.5 percent of plaintiffs' attorneys in
personal injury cases filed ten or more lawsuits in his sample, as opposed to 42 percent of
defendants' attorneys).
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Irving Vann at the turn of the twentieth century.5 3 But the
phenomenon of specialist practitioners appears to have been more
than just the hyperbole of hide-bound reactionaries like Vann. By the
turn of the century, a few law schools had even begun to school
54
students in soliciting personal injury clients.
What exactly was the consequence of this early development of
repeat-play interests around the personal injury problem? For one
thing, it encouraged the settlement of claims. Tort lawyers in the early
twenty-first century regularly observe that only a tiny share of tort
claims go to trial. 55 They less often note that this pattern of
settlement rather than trial finds its roots in the early decades of the
law of torts. Lawrence Friedman's study of Alameda County,
California found that only 31.5 percent of 340 personal injury cases
filed between 1880 and 1900 went to trial. Already by the beginning of
the twentieth century, the percentage of cases going to trial had begun
to drop: only 20 percent of the personal injury cases filed in Alameda
County courts between 1901 and 1910 went to trial.5 6 By the late
1920s, the fraction of cases going to trial was miniscule: of a sample of
53. WITT, supra note 16, at 62-63. The result of the introduction of repeat-play agents on
our account generates increased value for the claims of the otherwise "have-nots." In turn, this
often leads to claims of extortionate behavior by the claims agents, whose portfolios give them
real bargaining power. See generally Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (discussing the modern rendition of the blackmail
argument in the context of the class action).
54. WITT, supra note 16, at 61; Louis ANTHES, LAWYERS AND IMMIGRANTS, 1870-1940: A
CULTURAL HISTORY 131-70 (2003).
55. See, e.g., Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 30 A.B.A. SEC. LIT. 1 (Winter 2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/journal/winter2004/home.html.
56. Friedman & Russell, supra note 48, at 307 (1990); see also Thomas D. Russell, Blood on
the Tracks: Turn-of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and Litigation in Alameda County,
California, Rohrschach Lecture at Rice University 4 (Oct. 29, 1998) (transcript available from
authors) [hereinafter Russell, Blood on the Tracks] (finding that 19.7 percent of claims handled
between 1897 and 1910 by an attorney for the Oakland Traction Company went to trial); Thomas
D. Russell, Death on the Tracks: Solace and Recompense in Turn-of-the Century Streetcar
Deaths, Presentation to the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting 10 (May 28, 1999)
(transcript available from authors) (finding that two of sixteen wrongful death actions filed
against the Oakland Traction Co. between 1907 and 1910 went to trial); Stephen Daniels,
Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural Counties, 19
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 381, 400-01 (1985) (stating that "contested trials would become less important
and migrate towards the top of the bar while uncontested judgments migrated to the bottom and
displaced trials as the modal category."); Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of
Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC'y REV. 267, 287
(1976) ("In 1890, more than one out of every three cases filed in Alameda County was brought to
trial. Today less than one in six has such a life cycle (a difference significant at the .1% level).").
Russell's study of the Oakland Traction Co. indicates just how misleading even percentages of
cases going to trial are when the denominator is cases filed in court rather than claims lodged
with the defendant. Between 1903 and 1905, the Oakland Traction Co. made payments on 581
personal injury claims even though only twenty-two personal injury cases were filed against the
company in the courts. Russell, Blood on the Tracks, supra, at 13.
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almost 25,000 third-party liability insurance claims paid by the
Travelers Insurance Company in the late 1920s, 82 percent were paid
without a suit ever having been filed, whereas only 2 percent of the
claims were paid after judgments.5 7 A decade later, a federal study of
railroad employee injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
found that of almost 14,000 claims settled with some cash payment by
the railroad employer, only about 100 cases went to trial, though that
figure included between 8 and 16 percent of the death and permanent
total disability cases. 58 And by the middle of the twentieth century,
industry studies estimated that only 1.7 percent of incurred
automobile liability insurance losses was paid to claimants as a result
of court judgments; over 98 percent of automobile cases settled prior to
judgment. 59 In the early decades of the tort system, rising settlement
rates already suggested that specialized claims agents were filling the
market opportunities created by the explosion in tort suits.
Indeed, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, the most
insightful American jurists had begun to see that the development of
repeat-play interests around personal injury settlements promised to
shift the nature of personal injury practice. Nicholas St. John Green
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in particular, glimpsed in the
developing practices of the law of torts the halting and partial
beginnings of a mature economy of mass harms. In the early 1870s,
Green noted that American tort law had begun to develop along the
lines of the aggregate actuarial phenomena with which insurance
underwriters dealt.60 And before the nineteenth century was out,
Justice Holmes noted famously that "the torts with which our courts
are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known
businesses" such as "railroads, factories, and the like." 61 As Justice
Holmes pointed out, the significance of these repeat-play defendants
was that they seemed to make tort cases a matter of aggregate rather
than individualized treatment. 62 Liability for repetitive harms, Justice

57. See Report from the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, to the
Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences 24 n.9 (1932) [hereinafter
Columbia Report] (on file with the authors).
58. UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, REPORT TO SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE ON INCIDENCE OF WORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD
INDUSTRY: THEIR COST, AND SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 9 (1947) [hereinafter
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD].

59. Effective Auto Claims Handling Refutes Critics, 9 FOR THE DEF. 59, 59 (1968); see also
Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 895, 895
n.5 (1953).
60.

HORWITZ, supra note 16, at 59.

61. See Holmes, supra note 15, at 467.
62. Id.
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Holmes explained, was readily estimated by defendants. 63 Jury
determinations in particular cases, by contrast, were mere "chance,
once in a while rather arbitrarily interrupting the regular course of
recovery," and perhaps "therefore better done away with. '6 4
In one sense, the descriptions of tort law offered by Green and
Justice Holmes were wildly futuristic. Even at the beginning of'the
twenty-first century, a full century after Green's and Justice Holmes's
speculative musings, American tort jurists continue to resist the overt
introduction of the actuarial tools of the statistician into the formal
law of torts. 65 Yet in important respects, Justice Holmes and Green
had a much better sense than many reluctant jurists in the century
since of trends in the world of tort litigation, as opposed to the slowermoving world of formal doctrine. For if tort lawyers have often
resisted the introduction of statistical aggregation techniques at the
retail level of decided cases and tort doctrine, they have been pioneers
in the aggregation of tort cases at the wholesale level of settlement. In
the deep shadows of the law of torts, out of the field of vision of the
treatise writers and the jurists and the doctrinal synthesizers,
American tort lawyers have for more than a century now been quietly
developing a privatized, virtually unregulated, sometimes exploitative,
but sometimes quite sensible, system of aggregated settlement
techniques for the resolution of mature torts.
B. Employers' Liability, Repeat Players, and the Beginnings of
Aggregated Settlement
Work accidents presented the first forum for the widespread
development of the kinds of privatized settlement systems that have
come to characterize tort practice in areas involving mature torts.
Though Green and Justice Holmes may have been the first to bring
the mass-tort features of the emerging law of personal injury to the
attention of elite jurists, state civil servants had begun to make
similar observations in the 1870s and 1880s. 66 "The Moloch of

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65. For resistance to statistical techniques, see Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?
on JudicialProof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Laurence H.
Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1810, 1810-11 (1971);
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:Precisionand Ritual in The Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1329-30 (1971). For more favorable reviews of the use of statistical tools, see Judge
Weinstein's campaign for a different approach in cases like In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. 86
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), as well as SCHAUER, supra note 33, and Daniel Shaviro, Statistical Probability
Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 543-48 (1989).
66.

WITT, supra note 16, at 141.
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industrial activity," announced the reports of state departments of
labor statistics, "demands a sacrifice of life and limb, constant, as the
long as human contrivances
actuarial tables show, and inevitable so
67
and human understanding are fallible."
State reports on work accident statistics were published
against the background of the enactment in Western Europe of formal,
publicly-managed compensation systems for workplace accident
victims. 6 8 In the United States, by contrast, the work injury crisis of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated (at least
at first) a series of privatized compensation systems in the shadow of
the common law of torts. 69 Indeed, many employers (and even some
plaintiffs' representatives) developed private settlement structures
that resembled the workmen's compensation schemes of Western
Europe as much as they did the doctrinal architecture of the American
law of torts.7 0
For one thing, some American employers-especially the
largest and most managerially sophisticated-began in the 1880s and
1890s to adopt employer-specific, contractual workmen's compensation
systems in which employees waived their right to sue in return for
scheduled accidental disability benefits.7 1 When the ex ante waivers of
the right to sue in these early examples of welfare capitalism were
held unenforceable, employers often converted them into simple ex
post settlement systems in which employees could choose between
advancing a case to trial or selecting from the compensation scheme's
72
scheduled settlement offer.
Even where employers did not adopt formal compensation
schemes, however, studies of the ways in which work injuries were
compensated in the pre-workmen's compensation era suggest that
many employers developed standardized settlement practices closely
resembling the kinds of administrative claims processing emerging at
virtually the same time in Western European workmen's
compensation systems. In a highly schematic model of work accident
settlements in the early American tort system, one would expect many
employers to trade the uncertainties of their negligence defense for
67. Id.
68. DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 223-25
(1998); WITT, supra note 16, at 9-10, 95-96.

69. Id. at 43-125.
70. Id. at 103-25.
71.

PRICE FISHBACK & SHAWN KANTOR, PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE 91-92 (2000);

WITT, supra note 16, at 113-116; Richard Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800 (1982); John Fabian Witt,
Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2003).
72. See WITT, supra note 16, at 123.

1586

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1571

limitations on the unpredictability of a jury award. Similarly, one
would expect injured employees, many of whom would have been
deprived of their earning capacity, to opt for certain and immediate
payment rather than the vagaries and delays of litigation.
Further, one would expect the private administrative
settlement system to discount settlement awards for the risk of
plaintiff non-recovery across the entire at-risk population, rather than
in one case at a time. For example, assume a set of comparable
industrial accidents were 70 percent likely to be the product of
employer negligence, as opposed to contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, or any other defense to liability. Under an
idealized system of individualized trials, the plaintiff would win 70
percent of the time, and the employer 30 percent of the time. In those
cases where the plaintiff wins, the recovery would be 100 percent of
the value of the injury; where the plaintiff loses, the recovery would be
zero. A highly-idealized mature administrative settlement system, by
contrast, would internalize the proportionate win rates by reducing all
awards to a corresponding percentage of what might be obtained at
trial. In other words, a mature system spreads the risk of non-recovery
across potential claimants, rather than concentrating the losses (and
the gains of complete recovery) in subsets of claimants, some of whom
come out ahead, and some of whom suffer devastating losses.
As a result, in a mature system one would expect to find that a
higher proportion of claimants are compensated than would be the
case were all cases litigated to judgment, and one would expect the
recoveries to be less than those received by claimants who had
actually litigated a case to judgment. This, of course, is the basic
structure of the workers' compensation system. And this is also
roughly what we find in the American common law of employers'
liability before its replacement by workers' compensation.
The best evidence on pre-workers' compensation employers'
liability settlements comes from the recent work of Price Fishback and
Shawn Kantor.7 3 In their account, employee recoveries under the tort
system resembled in many ways those that would soon be produced by
the workmen's compensation system. A considerably higher
percentage of work accident victims under the pre-workers'
compensation tort system received payments from their employers
than would have been able to obtain judgments in a tort suit.74 At the
same time, the dollar amounts of those payments were considerably
smaller than the amounts that would have been recovered had those
73.
74.

FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 71, at 28-53.
Id. at 34.
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same employees prevailed in tort suits, typically amounting to only a
75
fraction of the losses incurred by the injured worker recipients.
Indeed, we see virtually the same pattern in other studies of
employers' liability litigation. 76 When the Railroad Retirement Board
studied work accidents on the railroads, for example, it found that
average payments to injured employees under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act were almost identical to average payments made in
railroad injury cases falling under state workmen's compensation
laws. Wage loss replacement for claims under the two systems-tort
and workmen's compensation-tended to cluster between 30 and 60
percent of lost wages. 77 Only among higher-paid train and engine
service employees, for whom state workmen's compensation award
statutory ceilings kicked in, did the tort system offer significantly
different (because higher) average damage awards. 78 By the end of the
1950s, the most extensive empirical examinations of the operation of
the personal injury settlement market were finding that tort law was
neither "the all-or-nothing proposition that its rules envision and its
critics decry," 79 nor the lottery system that some of today's
commentators decry,8 0 but instead a matter of "part-recovery-most-of81
the-time."
High settlement rates, widespread (if usually small) recoveries,
and discounted claims values were not the only ways in which
employers' liability practice mimicked workers' compensation.
Anticipating workers' compensation damages grids, early employers'
liability practitioners developed rudimentary standardized procedures
for the valuation of claims on a categorical rather than individualized
basis.

75. Id. at 43-42.
76. See, e.g., Columbia Report, supra note 57, at 273 tbl.16 (focusing on automobile accident
injury claimants in the late 1920s); Russell, Blood on the Tracks, supra note 56, at 1 (listing
streetcar injury claimants in the first decade of the twentieth century).
77.

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, supra note 58, at 119 tbl.27.

78. Id. tbl.22.
79. Marc A. Franklin et. al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of
Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35 (1961).
80. E.g., Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 778 (1967).
81. Franklin et. al., supra note 79, at 35; see also PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 49-50 (1985) (describing stability in the

settlement marketplace in medical malpractice claims and arguing that "the tort system in
practice is far from random"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System - And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1213 (1992) ("The
allegation that the tort system is an erratic lottery is exaggerated .... More than 90 percent of
claims are settled out of court. Two-thirds are closed within two years of filing. On average,
claims settle for 74 percent of their potential verdict.").
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Lawrence Friedman has observed that repeat-play defendants
began to establish claims departments and to develop "standard
82
procedures" for settling the repetitive claims that came before them.
Perhaps as a result of such standardized claims practices, employee
accident compensation in practice tended to depart from what the
formal law of torts might have provided in any individual case.
Fishback and Kantor have found that although common law tort
doctrines "influenced the probability and level of accident
payments ... they were clearly not the only influences and sometimes
not even the dominant influence."8 3 There is even some evidence to
suggest that employer negligence did not raise the amount paid to
accident victims in nonfatal accident cases, though the link between
employer negligence and compensation paid is clearer in fatal accident
cases.8 4 Indeed, the relative unimportance of the fault question in
some work accident settings appears on the face of the accident notice
forms used by liability insurers and their insureds. In the years before
workmen's compensation statutes, some employers' liability insurers
even dropped questions about whether the injury was "due to any
85
negligence or fault" from their notice forms altogether.
Employers' liability practice, in short, seems often to have
moved away from individualized determinations of claims measured
against the baseline of tort doctrine. Particular employers' group
personnel-management decisions often appear to have been more
significant than the individual merits of any particular case in
shaping the settlement values of pre-workmen's compensation claims.
The management of labor turnover and workforce morale, for
example, seems to have prompted many employers to provide small
amounts of compensation to their injured employees even where the
employer had not set up a formal work accident compensation
scheme.8 6 Similarly, employers' decisions to outsource work injury
compensation by acquiring liability insurance appear to have

82.

Friedman, supra note 47, at 372; see also Hield, 13 STREET RAILWAY J. 770 (1897).

83.

FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 71, at 45.

84. Id. at 44.
85. See, e.g., notices of accidents made out at Lyman Mills for the American Mutual
Liability Insurance Company in Boston. Lyman Mills Claims Forms, (on file with Baker Library,
Harvard Business School, in Lyman Mills Collection, Box LAD-1). Notice forms prior to October
1910 ask for the employer's evaluation of fault and negligence; subsequent notice forms drop the
negligence and fault question. Id. Workmen's compensation legislation did not go into effect in
Massachusetts until July 1912. Letter from Sydney A. Williams, secretary, American Mutual
Liability Insurance Company, to The Lyman Mills, (Dec. 13, 1911) (on file with Baker Library,
Harvard Business School, in Lyman Mills Collection, Box ED-1, Folder ED-3).
86. See, e.g., Letter to Insurer (June 3, 1897) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business
School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-30).
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significantly increased their injured employees' likelihood of receiving
87
post-accident compensation.
The emergence of employers' liability insurance added an
additional repeat-play institution to the settlement mix. The presence
of employers' liability insurance appears to have increased the
probability that an injured employee would receive some
compensation.8 8 Insurers, in other words, appear to have moved
89
settlement practices closer to the model of settlements set out above.
Indeed, from early on, employers' liability insurers adopted
streamlined bureaucratic mechanisms for settling work accident
disputes. At one remove from the shop floor, early liability insurers
developed rough rules-of-thumb for the evaluation of work accident
cases, adopting categorical approaches to claims resolution rather
than making individualized inquiries. Was the employee new to the
machine at which he was working when injured, or was he
experienced with it?90 Was the employee engaged in her usual
occupation when injured?9 1 Did the injured employee speak the
92
language in which warnings or safety instructions were posted?
Standardized form responses to employers' claims - typically
reporting "no legal liability"93 or that "no liability should attach" 94 predominated. Individualized inquiries into the particulars of a given
injury were extraordinarily rare.

87. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 71, at 48.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (Nov. 8, 1897) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-30);
Letter from Charles E. Hodges, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, to Dwight
Manufacturing Company (May 6, 1907) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in
Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-41).
91. See, e.g., Lyman Mills Claims Forms (Jan. 1890) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard
Business School, in Lyman Mills Collection, Box LAC-1); Accident Report Form (Mar. 1888 Aug. 1892) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Lawrence Manufacturing
Company Records, Folder GO-i,).
92. See, e.g., American Mutual Liability Insurance Company forms (printed for Dwight
Manufacturing Company) (Oct. 22, 1901) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School,
in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-1); Lyman Mills Claims Forms, (Sept. 1909) (on file
with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Lyman Mills Collection, Box LAC-9);
93. Letters (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing
Collection, Letter File ML-35).
94. Letters from Employer's Liability Insurance Corporation, Ltd., to Lawrence
Manufacturing Company (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Lawrence
Manufacturing Collection, Letter File GP-1)..
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C. Plaintiffs'-Side Claims Brokers and the Case of the Dwight
Manufacturing Company
So far, our discussion of the consequences of repeat players in
American tort practice has focused on the defense side. Indeed, repeat
players developed much more slowly on the plaintiffs' side. 95 Yet even
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the years
before workmen's compensation statutes, we find evidence that the
market in work injury claims led again and again to the emergence of
groups of claimant representatives-lawyers and otherwise--who
developed portfolios of claims against precisely the kinds of
institutions that were becoming repeat-players on the defense side.
Consider the picture of accident claims practice that emerges
from one extraordinary resource for studying pre-workers'
compensation employers' liability practice: the liability insurance files
of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, a textile firm in Chicopee,
Massachusetts that employed a largely Polish-immigrant workforce to
manufacture sheetings, shirtings, and fancy cottons. 96 Dwight was
insured by the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, based
in Boston. 97 The overwhelming majority of the accidents Dwight
reported to American Mutual were relatively slight injuries to
employees' hands, fingers, and feet, for which American Mutual
98
typically paid minor medical expenses.
Many of the patterns we have described above appear in
Dwight's injury settlement practices as well, including the vastly
disproportionate relationship of adjudicated cases to claims settled, 99
the adoption of settlement strategies designed for personnel
management purposes rather than simply in exchange for waivers of

95. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
96. See CARL GERSUNY, WORK HAZARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1976) (describing the
Dwight Manufacturing Company's accident compensation practices). Gersuny's early archival
work led us to the Baker Library's rich collection of employers' liability insurer records.
97. Letters (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing
Collection, Letter File ML-30).
98. See, e.g., Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (June 3, 1897) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-30).
99. Out of thousands of total claims in the Dwight Manufacturing Company files, there is a
mere one reported case arising out of injuries at the Dwight Manufacturing Company before
1913. See Glover v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 18 N.E. 597, 599 (Mass. 1888) (affirming jury verdict for
thirteen-year-old female plaintiff whose fingers were injured while cleaning a machine on the
ground that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found
defendant negligent and plaintiff free of contributory negligence).
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prospective tort liability, 10 0 and the use of standard form denials of
liability as a matter of course in the bureaucratic handling of
claims. 10 1 There is also evidence of still another aggregating practice:
trading off settlement funds from one claimant or group of claimants
to another, as when Dwight encouraged American Mutual to provide
extra funds to certain injured employees out of the savings of money
102
that had been "kept back" from other injury claimants.
Dwight and American Mutual also used their repeat-player
position to improve their bargaining position as much as possible. In
cases of severe injury, they put to use what they called the "Chicopee
method of settlement" (named after the location of the Dwight mill):
waiting until the family members of a disabled Dwight employee "get
hungry for money before going to see them."10 3 Additionally, American
Mutual often advised Dwight to take steps to ensure that it would
maintain favorable asymmetries of information about the law and the
facts.10 4 The insurer sometimes discouraged Dwight from asking
pointed questions that might lead a possible claimant to infer the
existence of a new legal rule around which she might tailor her
testimony. 105 In other cases, American Mutual instructed Dwight to
bar injured employees and their representatives from access to the
mill (and thus access to the scene of the injury) prior to receiving a
waiver of liability. 10 6 In the work accident area, it seems, Marc
Galanter's "haves" were coming out ahead already in the late
10 7
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
100. See, e.g., Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company (Mar. 14, 1902) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in
Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-2).
101. See, e.g., Printed Form (Oct. 24, 1899) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business
School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-32).
102. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company (Apr. 24, 1902) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight
Manufacturing Collection, HL-2).
103. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company (Mar. 17, 1902) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight
Manufacturing Collection, HL-2).
104. See, e.g., Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (July 13, 1897) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-36)
(instructing Dwight to "keep the case out of the hands of the enemy").
105. Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (July 28, 1897) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-30).
106. Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (Mar. 15, 1904) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-36).
107. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 95, 103-105 (1974) (referring to repeat players in litigation as
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Whenever the haves came out ahead because of superior
information or economies of scale, however, a new entrepreneurial
opportunity was created for agents able to develop information and
amass claims of their own. In effect, the emergence of a claims market
generated an opportunity for arbitrage by agents able to replicate on
the claimants' side the efficiencies of centralizing information and
coordinating claims. Thus, we find, at almost the same time, an
interesting phenomenon developing in Dwight's employees' accident
settlement practices: the introduction of informal claimant-side agents
or claims brokers who appear quickly to have built up portfolios of
claims. 108
At Dwight, early claims brokers were not lawyers but
interpreters, who served as intermediaries between the firm and its
Polish employees. This emergence of interpreters as intermediaries is
hardly surprising given that immigration provided the human muscle
for the great period of American industrialization.
The first
interpreter appeared in Dwight's correspondence to American Mutual
in 1902,109 and in a short time references to interpreters became
commonplace. 110 By 1909 and 1910, a small cadre of shady and often
unnamed interpreter claims brokers, led by a man named Starzyk,
came to play an increasingly important role in the management of
employee injury claims at Dwight."' Importantly, the introduction of
claimant-side repeat-play agents had significant consequences for the
claims settlement market. In particular, negotiations between Dwight
and American Mutual, on one hand, and claims brokers, on the other,
expressly took into account not just the circumstances of the
particular case presented to them, but also the run of cases in the
"haves" and noting that most repeat players "are larger, richer, and more powerful than are most
... [one-shotters].").
108. Cf. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION

(1990).
109. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company (July 9, 1902) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight
Manufacturing Collection, HL-2).
110. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Co. to American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.
(Feb. 28, 1903) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing
Collection, HL-2); Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company (May 4, 1904) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in
Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-2); Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company (May 26, 1908) (on file with Baker Library,
Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-3).
111. See, e.g., Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company (Feb. 17, 1910) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in
Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-3); Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company (Aug. 8, 1910) (on file with Baker Library,
Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-3).
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claims brokers' portfolios. The settlement of injury cases thus became
an increasingly aggregate endeavor, as the firm, the insurer, and the
repeat-play claimants' agents sought to manage the run of claims
arising out of the mill's operations.
Concentrating claims in the hands of these agents was not
without peril for injured employees. Without clear competition among
contending potential brokers and without easy recourse to the more
transparent tort system, there was a strong risk of what might
tactfully be termed high agency costs--or, less tactfully, betrayal. In
some cases, it seems that claims brokers colluded with firms to take
advantage of the injured claimants. 1 12 We can tell from Dwight's files
that the brokers were taking payment not just from the claimants, in
the form of contingency fees, but also (and perhaps unbeknownst to
the claimants) from Dwight itself. 113 Indeed, Dwight regularly noted
the assistance that "friendly" interpreters had provided in reducing
the amounts claimed by injured employees. 114 Brokers like Starzyk
found themselves in the position of talking employees into accepting
settlement offers the employees had previously viewed as too small. 115
And claims brokers often warned Dwight about the arrival of "shyster
lawyers" at an employee's doorstep. 11 6 In short, the claims brokers
sometimes took advantage of their ability to offer something that mass
tort defendants would later describe in precisely the same terms as
Dwight managers and American Mutual officials: settlement "for the
117
sake of peace."

112. See generally, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort ClassAction, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (describing parallel risks in the modern class-action
context) [hereinafter Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The
New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 851-52 (1995) (same); Samuel Issacharoff,
Class-Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 805, 812-813 (1997) (same) [hereinafter Class
Action Conflicts]; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class-Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 372 (same).
113. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company (July 15, 1911) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight
Manufacturing Collection, HL-4).
114. See, e.g., Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company (Feb. 17, 1910) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in
Dwight Manufacturing Collection, HL-3).
115. Id.
116. Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Company to American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company (Mar. 21, 1902) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight
Manufacturing Collection, HL-3).
117. Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (July 12, 1911) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-44); see
also Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class-Action, 115
HARv. L. REV. 747, 749-59 (2002) (analyzing mass tort defendants a century later).
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Yet claims brokers also provided a valuable service to injured
employees who, as Galanter's "one-shotters,"118 faced steep
informational deficits and often powerful risk aversion obstacles to
maximizing the value of their settlements. 1 9 For one thing, it is
entirely plausible to think that the claims brokers were as duplicitous
(or more so) in their dealings with Dwight as Dwight's files suggest
they sometimes were in their dealings with clients. But duplicity
aside, the claims-broker go-betweens performed a valuable service in
the informal accident compensation system at Dwight. With ongoing
reputational stakes on both sides, the claims brokers served an
important gatekeeper role, providing Dwight and American Mutual
with a shorthand way of identifying credible claims worth
compensating. 120 At the same time, the claims brokers provided their
employee-clients a modicum of expertise and repeat-play know-how in
dispute resolution, while minimizing the risk that Dwight would
single out their claims for hardball settlement tactics.' 2' Indeed,
Dwight and American Mutual seem to have understood very well the
complex and potentially dangerous dual functions played by
interpreters who could very quickly stir up expensive claims against
them.' 22 Even the apparently compromised agents at the Dwight

118. Galanter, supra note 107, at 97 (describing "one-shotters" as those litigants who do not
participate in litigation very often).
119. The consequences of claimant risk aversion in tort settlement appear to turn on the
framing effects of whether the claimant sets his or her possible future tort judgment damages as
the baseline, departure from which in the form of a settlement would be a downward departure,
or instead sets the pre-judgment status quo as the baseline, departure from which in the form of
a settlement would be an upward departure. See generally literature on law and behavioral
economics.
120. Presentation of claims that turned out after the fact not to have been worth paying
would have done in a claimsbroker's reputation. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee
Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997) (analyzing
plaintiffs representatives as gatekeepers); see also John C. Coffee Jr., The Attorney as
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003) (developing a model of
attorneys as gatekeepers).
121. See Mnookin & Gilson, supra note 8, at 513 (describing the value of lawyers as ongoing
repeat-players in bargaining games). As Herbert M. Kritzer has pointed out, contingency fee
agents, such as lawyers, are inhibited from seeking their own interests at their clients' expense
by the need to maintain reputational capital among the pool of future clients. Herbert M.
Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities,
and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 801-02
(1998).
122. Letter from Charles E. Hodges, Assistant Manager, American Mutual Liability
Insurance Company, to Dwight Manufacturing Company (Dec. 4, 1911) (on file with Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing Collection, Letter File ML-44);
Letter from Dwight Manufacturing Co. to American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. (July 11,
1911) (on file with Baker Library, Harvard Business School, in Dwight Manufacturing
Collection, HL-4).
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Manufacturing Company seem to have facilitated recoveries for the
injured workers at Dwight.
In the Dwight case, the development of repeat-players, first on
the defense side and then later on both the defense and the plaintiffs'
sides, had powerful consequences for the ways in which tort law
played out. At Dwight and elsewhere, when one actually looks beyond
the layers of reported cases, beyond the jury verdicts and even beyond
the case filings, and instead focuses on the ground-level practices of
claims resolution in the first American experience of mass harm, one
finds a tort system that informally functioned much like the formal
workmen's compensation system that replaced it.123
Formal
compensation systems, of course, had the potential to operate with
considerably greater systemic rationality than the informal aggregate
settlement systems that they replaced; all too many needy and
deserving claimants surely went uncompensated
or undercompensated in the informal settlement regime that grew up in the
pre-workmen's
compensation
era. And where
the
private
administration of the tort system made it difficult for public
institutions to collect information about the extent and severity of the
work injury problem, formal compensation systems in the work
accident area served to create a mechanism for information
124
collection.
But the absence of a formalized, systematic rationality should
not distract us from significant similarities between the two regimes.
Both compensated relatively large percentages of work injury victims
-- considerably more than the formal doctrine would have suggestedby providing them with awards that were more certain, albeit smaller,
than those that might have emerged in fully litigated cases. Both
adopted rule-of-thumb categories and stereotyped claims practices,
rather than conducting individualized inquiries, to determine
questions of compensation. To be sure, the tort system allowed Justice
Holmes's "chance, once in a while"'125 case to go to a jury, but the

123. Our observation here is consistent with the observations of many of those who have
researched the law of torts in action. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 23, at 246; see also FISHBACK &
KANTOR, supra note 71, at 59 (coming to the same conclusion as to damages amounts).
124. For further consideration of the relative merits of private aggregation and public
compensation systems, see infra text accompanying notes 208-212. Privately administered
settlement systems rely on information about claims valuations and claims volume that is
privately-held by the repeat-players in the system and often not publicly available. In other
words, in addition to raising questions about doctrinal barriers to trial (such as summary
judgment) or the development of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in lieu of trial, the
diminished role of trial as claims mature often removes information about the underlying
phenomena from the public sphere.
125. Holmes, supra note 15.
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available evidence suggests that such cases were especially few and
far between when repeat-play defendants were involved. Indeed,
neither settlement in the shadow of the tort system nor compensation
through a publicly-run system provided the typical claimant with a
day in court. Instead, the private tort system, like its public
counterpart, created institutional mechanisms to respond to
"accidents" that were probabilistically certain ex ante, even as the
identity of individual victims was unknown.
D. Informal Aggregation in Early Mass Harms
The Dwight Manufacturing Company experience, of course, is
just one case study. More work would need to be done across a wider
spectrum of firms before concluding that the Dwight experience
accurately represents the claims practices in other repeat-player,
mature tort contexts. But the very nature of the phenomenon that we
seek to describe-privatized, informal, and unpublished-makes the
occasional glimpse into the real world of mature tort settlement
126
practices extremely valuable.
Moreover, there is good reason to think that the Dwight
experience is not anomalous. In a variety of contexts, in work
accidents and elsewhere, repeat-play actors seem to have been filling
the markets for settlement created by the late-nineteenth-century
injury crisis. Consider the 1890s law practice of one Samuel Evans
Maires of Philadelphia. Maires specialized in claims against the
Philadelphia Traction Company, which operated trolleys. His practice
consisted essentially of purchasing causes of action from a stable of
claimants, providing them with much-needed cash and with the
certainty of some kind of recovery, while assuming for himself the risk
and the reward of an outsized judgment or settlement. 127 Or think of
the practice of Arthur E. Clark of upstate New York, who developed a
portfolio of more than 2,000 claims by property owners against New
York telephone and telegraph companies in the late 1890s. Clark
created economies of scale, spread claimants' risk of being subject to a
down-side outlier judgment, and offered defendants the opportunity
128
for a global (or near-global) settlement.
Similar early plaintiff-side aggregation practices arose out of
mass torts such as dam breaks, mine explosions, and train wrecks. In
one 1911 dam break at Black River Falls, Wisconsin, for example, a
126. See Saks, supra note 81, at 212 (describing the difficulty of getting good information
about the workings of the private settlement system).
127. Maires's Case, 2 Pa. D. 297, 297 (Pa. Common Pleas 1898).
128. In re Clark, 77 N.E. 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 1906).
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single Wisconsin law firm signed up a large number of property
damage claimants and arranged to have all its clients' claims assigned
to one claimant for trial. 129 Aggregation allowed the firm to create
economies of scale by avoiding the multiplication of costs necessary to
bring individual claims. 1 ° Similarly, a 1902 mine explosion in
Fraterville, Tennessee, led one law partnership to take on 40 of the
approximately 190 claims brought against the company. 131 Riskaverse claimants may thereby have sought to reduce the risk that
their cases would produce a downside outlier judgment on either the
question of liability or the question of damages. The law partners, by
contrast, very likely sought to achieve some (if not all) of the
economies of scale that the Black River Falls law firm would achieve a
few years later.
A few decades later, the Railroad Retirement Board study of
railroad employee injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
found that fraternal orders and railroad brotherhoods were taking on
a role in employee injury claims similar to the role played by repeatplay claims agents in the early mass torts.1 32 As the Board discovered,
"In the great majority of the serious injuries and in practically all the
less severe injuries, claims under the liability act are settled by a
quasi-bargaining process."1 33 The railroads were represented by "claim
agent[s] specializing in injury cases" who were "master[s] of the
technique of 'adjusting' claims."1 3 4 And though employee claimants
generally went without representation, many such claimants were
represented by a railroad brotherhood lodge chairman or some other
union official. 135 Lodge and union officials were in an especially good
position to minimize informational asymmetries between the parties
and to establish ongoing reputational stakes for railroad claims
agents. Not surprisingly, claimants with representation from the
unions did much better in settlement negotiations than those
without. 3 6 Indeed, as early as the beginning of the 1930s, at least one
railroad brotherhood had expanded its program of legal aid through a

129. Ellis v. Frawley, 161 N.W. 364, 365 (Wis. 1917)
130. Id. at 365-66.
131. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 98 S.W. 178 (Tenn. 1906).
132. See RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that at settlement
discussions, "[tihe employer is represented by the claim agent and the employee generally speaks
for himself or is assisted by the local lodge chairman or other union official").
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 47-48.

135. Id. at 10, 48.
136. Id.
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formal Legal Aid Department that provided injured members with
137
referrals to qualified plaintiff-side FELA lawyers.
Of course, as in the Dwight case, such arrangements
sometimes involved abuses of the power of claimant-side agents. With
at least one defendant, for example, Arthur Clark of upstate New York
simply turned around and sold the claims in return for $3,000 for his
own account, promising to "help ...in the settlement of the cases,"
and to keep his clients from going to other lawyers, and authorizing
the company to settle his clients' claims "at your own terms and
figures. '138
And whether or not Samuel Maires was offering a
valuable service to some of his Philadelphia trolley car clients - and
there is some reason to think he was-he also appeared to have
systematically lied to other clients about the amounts received in
settlement payments from Philadelphia Traction. 13 9
Yet we have no reason to believe that abuses such as those that
may have taken place in the Clark and Maires cases were the rule
rather than the exception. Where the claimants' agent was not, like
Clark, apparently planning to exit the industry, claimants were often
acting quite rationally to seek such a repeat-player in the claimants'
agent business. As Herbert Kritzer has observed, and as the Dwight
Manufacturing Company's injured employees seem to have
understood, the ongoing reputational interests of such contingency fee
agents in the pool of possible future clients effectively aligned the
interests of the agents with their clients.1 40 Far from being an
indicator of exploitation, then, the aggregation of claimants by
plaintiffs' agents often served as a bonding mechanism ensuring an
41
agent's fidelity to the claimant's interests.1
137. Bhd. of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); George E. Bodle, Group Legal
Services: The Case for BRT, 12 UCLA L. REV. 306, 309 (1964).
138. Clark would "write conciliatory letters to all who write asking about settlements, and to
aid in every way possible in making the settlements." In re Clark, 77 N.E. 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 1906).
139. Maire's Case, 2 Pa. D. 297, 297 (Pa. Common Pleas 1898).
140. Kritzer, supra note 120, at 795-802.
141. Critics of market mechanisms, to ensure lawyer accountability, often point to the
apparent absence of price competition in the market for contingent-fee legal services as evidence
of the inadequacy of such mechanisms. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent
Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is it Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 115-25 (2003)
(contending that the lack of price competition due to the rigidity of standard contingent fee
pricing has not been counteracted by market solutions because of lawyers' control over the
market for tort claims). As economists have long observed, however, price convergence is often
evidence of the competitiveness of a market, not of collusion or monopoly: this is the so-called
"law of one price." See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213,
214 (1961); Charles Engel & John H. Rogers, How Wide is the Border, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1112,
1112 (1996). Moreover, if we look closely, there is evidence of at least some long-standing
informal price competition among the plaintiffs' bar. Of 186 cases in which the 1932 Columbia
study of auto accident injuries was able to determine the amount of an arms-length lawyers' fee,
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The over-representation of cheats and swindlers in our story is
no doubt in part an artifact of the evidentiary sources. The best
sources for otherwise invisible plaintiff-side aggregation are the
disciplinary cases of state bar associations. Early attempts at
aggregation by claimants' agents ran headlong into professional
disciplinary prohibitions on champerty 142 and on the improper
solicitation of claims. 14 3 And yet as one claimants'-side agent cogently
put it in defense of his firm's solicitation practices, to obstruct
claimants'-side agents from accumulating portfolios of claims was to
leave the field to the repeat-players on the defense side: "their
monopoly is established, competition is banished, rivals are crushed,
[and] the trust rule is enthroned."'144 An occasional court agreed. As a
Tennessee county chancery court noted shortly after the turn of the
twentieth century, if a single lawyer or a single firm can represent "a
large business in its operation causing or originating successive suits,"
ought not a plaintiffs'-side lawyer or firm be able to solicit the cases
145
thus caused?
E. An Excursion Into the Theory of Settlement: Market Makers and
Settlement Values
Focusing on the colorful characters that emerge in the roughand-tumble of early tort law should also not obscure the significance of
such repeat-play actors in bringing an informal rationality to the tort
system. Repeat-play agents permit private settlement systems to
emerge based on the information the agents possess about the value of
claims in the retail litigation market of adjudication. By allowing for
the wholesale resolution of claims through settlement, instead of the
expensive prospect of retail resolution through actual trial, the repeat
agents perform an arbitrage function, in which the overall system
92 cases involved fees of 25 percent or less of the total recovery; 76 cases involved fees of between
25 and 50 percent of the total recovery; and 18 cases involved fees of 50 percent or more of the
total recovery. Columbia Report, supra note 57, at 42-43 n.23. For contemporary anecdotal
evidence of such informal, below-the-radar-screen price competition, see Adam Liptak & Michael
Moss, In Trial Work, Edwards Left a Trademark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at Al (describing
tort clients who reported that "all the lawyers they interviewed except Mr. Edwards wanted onethird of any award... (but that) Mr. Edwards offered to take a smaller percentage, unless the
award reached unexpected heights"). Thanks go to Ed Morrison and Peter Schuck for
conversations on the meaning of price convergence.
142. Ellis v. Frawley, 161 N.W. 364, 366 (Wis. 1917).
143. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 98 S.W. 178, 190 (Tenn. 1906).
144. Id. at 187 (quoting plaintiffs' counsel).
145. Id.at 182 (quoting and reversing the court below). The same theory has animated the
American Supreme Court's relaxation of the prohibitions on lawyer advertising in the modern
era. See generally, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633-34 (1995).
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moves toward greater efficiency while the agents themselves profit
from their role in providing predictability and order.
Our focus on the institutional role of these market makers
extends the contemporary legal understanding of the relation between
the small number of actually litigated cases and the capacity of the
legal system to settle cases. The standard models for explaining why
most cases settle and why some cases actually go to trial hinge largely
on the availability of information about likely litigated outcomes.' 46 In
the Mnookin-Kornhauser account of settlements bargained in the
shadow of the law, knowledge of likely results in litigation allows
parties to settle and thereby jointly benefit from the lower transaction
costs of not having to litigate. 14 7 Similarly, in the Priest-Klein model
of why cases go to trial, information plays a central role. 148 According
to the Priest-Klein hypothesis, cases go to trial either because litigants
erroneously overvalue their claims or, more likely, because there is
sufficient uncertainty about the state of the law so that litigants are
unable to form overlapping estimations of the value of the plaintiffs
claim. In either case, according to Priest-Klein, there is no directional
bias regarding which cases reach trial and, accordingly, the win-rates
of plaintiffs and defendants should be about 50-50.149
Together these two models focus on the role of decisional law,
coupled with a systemic commitment to respect for precedent, as a
public good that informs future disputants. Each of the models then
addresses the dilemmas that attach to all public goods: why would any
private party invest in the creation of a public good, and how do
parties realize the private benefit from the public good? To answer
the first question, Priest-Klein posit an equilibrium model in which
cases go to trial primarily because of an insufficiency of decisional law
that, once realized, protects others from similar inquiries in like cases.
The Mnookin-Kornhauser model then allows the availability of the
decisional law to inform subsequent disputants by creating a broader
ambit of resolution from the narrow outcome of adjudicated cases.

146. Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why do Cases Get Litigated?, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2002).
147. See generally Kornhauser & Mnookin, supra note 7.
148. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) ("[A]ccording to our model, the determinants of settlement and litigation
are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the
information that parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of
litigation and settlement.").
149. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 361, 371-72 (1991)

(testing the Priest-Klein hypothesis).
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Both Mnookin-Kornhauser and Priest-Klein rely on reported
decisional law and the knowledge of lawyer intermediaries to apprise
disputants of likely litigation outcomes so that they might reach
efficient settlements. 150
Although the institutional setting for
settlement is not a separate consideration in either model, each
assumes tacitly a world of individual actors making private decisions
in the shadow of decisional law. Both models are consistent with a
world of bipolar dispute resolution, and neither has occasion to
151
reexamine that assumption at any depth.
Even working within the established models of settlement,
however, it is possible to question the assumption that decisional law
is sufficient to guide settlement in tort suits. Under any theory of
bargaining, settlement is ultimately a matter of price. The question
then becomes how parties agree on an actual dollar value for a
claimed harm. While helpful, reported decisions are unlikely to give a
1 52
full rendering of the value of highly fact-dependent tort claims.
Decisional law will likely speak volumes about the doctrine of
assumption of the risk and other legal considerations affecting
liability. But settlement requires not just agreement on liability, but
also on the appropriate remedy. At its most basic, decisional law is
unlikely to be able to put a direct value on, for example, the
idiosyncratic claim of a twenty-five-year-old Latino man with a highschool degree who catches his dominant hand in a stamping press.
Even if a factually similar case has previously gone to trial and
has been recorded in the decisional law, it is not clear how much
information would be available to the parties in a later dispute. The
valuation of the remedy in tort disputes is so centrally a jury function
that there is little occasion for reported decisions to discuss the value
of the underlying claims absent a truly extraordinary appeal of the
remedy itself. Moreover, the most common form of judicial
intervention into the jury assessment of value, the use of remitittur or
150. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 148; Kornhauser & Mnookin, supra note 7.
151. Most of the studies that have tested the Priest-Klein hypothesis, with the most
comprehensive being Gross & Syverud, supra note 148, have tried to model the strategic
behavior of litigants as a component of the Priest-Klein equilibrium model. For example, Gross &
Syverud are highly attentive to the incentives created by contingency contracts as opposed to the
plaintiff having to bear the costs of litigation. They also focus on the reputational effect of
medical malpractice liability to explain the higher than expected trial rate and the low rate of
plaintiff success in these cases. In turn, Gross & Syverud examine repeat-players in terms of how
they affect the strategic elements of bargaining, as opposed to an independent examination of the
institutional forms of portfolio litigation.
152. For skepticism about the capacity of the thin layer of adjudicated cases to inform the
value of claims in the settlement market, see Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the
Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61, 73-80 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
and Saks, supra note 81, at 1223.
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additur to compel the parties to accept a verdict departing from the
jury's award, occurs in a little-discussed judicial gray area in which
the threat of mistrial cajoles parties to accept final judgment. Since
parties generally bargain for finality even after a jury award, this too
is likely to remain obscured from reported case law.
As a result, to bargain over highly fact-specific claims in the
shadow of the law requires knowledge far beyond what the reported
decisions can reveal. Parties seeking to settle need to know not only
doctrine but also value. Effective claims agents need to know what
similar claims settled for in the private market. They need to know
how those claims compared to more and less serious injury claims, or
even to death claims under similar working conditions. It is not too far
a stretch to describe the early plaintiff-side intermediaries as market
makers who, despite the presence of ruffians and cheats, allowed an
informed bargain to be forged in the shadow of the thin body of
actually litigated cases.

II. STAGE Two: THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

By the 1920s, as work accident rates in most U.S. industries
began to fall, attention among tort jurists turned to the problem of
automobile accidents. Here, too, was a social phenomenon that
produced an inevitable stream of injuries. Viewed from a sufficiently
high level of generality, automobile accident injuries and deaths were
the inevitable product of a mass driving society. As industrializing
societies such as China are discovering even today, putting thousands
upon thousands of automobiles on the roads results in certain injuries
- even though, once again, who is actually injured and under what
circumstances cannot be known ahead of time. Even as early as the
late 1910s in this country, the inevitability of significant numbers of
injuries led some observers to advocate the enactment of statutory
automobile injury compensation systems in place of tort.153
Supporters of such systems hoped to do for motor vehicle accidents
154
what workmen's compensation had done for work accidents.
In the decades since, the literature on automobile accidents has
been largely preoccupied with the contrast between such public nofault compensation systems and the law of tort. Indeed, in the tort
system, automobile claims have become the paradigm case for the way
153. WITT, supra note 16, at 194
154. WITT, supra note 16, at 149; Jonathon Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile
Accidents, Insuranceand the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.
521, 527-28 (1998).
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in which tort deals in individualized dispute resolution. Individual
drivers, after all, are virtually always one-shotters in the tort claims
system. Even the very worst drivers can hardly expect to develop
much repeat-play expertise, and those who do acquire repeat-play
status are usually not with us for long. Accordingly, as Deborah
Hensler has put it, "[N]o one would include 'fender-bender' cases
under the mass tort rubric." 155 Auto claims, in Professor Hensler's
words, are dealt with "individually" rather than "in a collective
156
fashion."
Or so one would think. Even here, in this classically
individualized area in tort, we can see the development of privatized
systems of aggregate settlement in the stereotyped claims practices of
automobile accidents' first repeat-play agents: liability insurance
claims adjusters.
Liability insurance claims practices began to shape the
settlement markets in auto tort claims even as state legislatures were
rejecting the first generation of no-fault public automobile injury
compensation plans. 157 The liability insurance premiums written by
stock insurance companies (by far the most important form of liability
insurer) increased from $64 million in 1918 to $212 million in 1927, an
86 percent increase after adjusting for inflation. 158
In 1927,
automobile liability insurance represented almost 70 percent of the
entire tort liability insurance market. 15 9 The same year witnessed
sharp growth in the number of states enacting "financial
responsibility laws" that required motorists to have insurance or
equivalent wherewithal to pay tort judgments. 16 0 Connecticut enacted
the first such statute in 1926, with Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont following in 1927.161 By 1935, twenty-

155. Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districtingin Mass Tort Litigation:An Empirical
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 887-88 (2001). Many thanks to Howard Erichson for
bringing this particular passage to our attention.
156. Id.

157. See WITT, supra note 16, at 194-95; Simon, supra note 154, at 524.
158. BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS: CASUALTY & MISCELLANEOUS 409 tbl. A (Alfred M. Best
Co., ed., 6th ed. 1919); BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS CASUALTY & MISCELLANEOUS 824 tbl. D

(Alfred M. Best Co., ed., 15th ed. 1928).
159. BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS CASUALTY & MISCELLANEOUS 824 tbl. D (Alfred M. Best

Co., ed., 15th ed. 1928). This tort liability insurance figure excluded workmen's compensation
liability insurance. Total workmen's compensation liability insurance premiums written in 1927
(stock and mutual companies combined) amounted to $212 million, equaling the total liability
insurance premiums written by stock companies in all other areas combined. Id.
160. 1935 Record Year for Financial Responsibility Laws, 36 BEST'S INS. NEWS (Casualty
Ed.) Feb. 1936, at 570, 570.
161. Id.
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eight states and the District of Columbia had enacted the laws.162 Ten
years later, stock casualty insurance companies alone were adjusting
some four million claims each year. 163
The growing presence of liability insurance in the automobile
accident area produced many of the same kinds of settlement patterns
that we observed in the work accident context, though some of the
processes by which those patterns came about were different. In the
work accident context, repeat-play claims agents, employers' ongoing
interest in workforce morale, and insurers' ongoing reputational
interests in the market for claims within the community of their
insured's employees powerfully shaped the dynamics of the settlement
market. Each of these factors exerted concerted pressure toward the
development of ongoing claims practices that took advantage of the
bargaining agents' relationships over time. Given the one-shot nature
of automobile accidents, by contrast, ongoing relationships rarely
existed, at least in the early years of automobile liability practice.
Instead, what we see in the automobile injury case is the unilateral
development by liability insurers of rules-of-thumb, settlement
formulae, and claims categories for the ready resolution of ordinary
cases.
To understand the claims practices in the auto accident field, it
is important to begin with the point that liability insurance claims
adjusting developed in the twentieth-century United States as a
markedly low-status occupation.' 64 The job came with little prestige,
relatively low pay, and high turnover rates. 165 Insurers frequently
complained about the difficulties of recruiting skilled adjusters, and
when they were able to do so, a good adjuster was likely to rise quickly
into the hierarchy of the home office. 166 Yet the work of insurance
adjusting seemed to require the exercise of considerable discretionary
judgment. 167 Was settlement appropriate? How much money would
purchase a release? How much was too much?
162. Id.
163. J. Dewey Dorsett, Human Relations, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), May 1946,
at 48.
164.

Wilson C. Jainsen, Confessions of a Claim Man, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty

Ed.), Sept. 1941, at 19 (writing in 1941 that "some twenty years ago claim men too frequently
smacked of the water front and a choice collection of billingsgate might then have been
considered a desirable asset for a claim man"); C.R, Carpenter, Claim Administration, BEST'S
INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), Mar. 1963, at 132-33 (stating that "historically, in our business,
there has been a concept that a claim man is a cross between a con-man and a house dick").
165. H.L. Handley, Jr., Claims Adjusting, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), Nov.
1964, at 114.

166. E.g., Carpenter, supra note 164, at 131-132; Handley, supranote 165, at 114.
167. Insurance Is Good or Bad, 27 BEST'S INS. NEWS (Casualty Ed.), June 1926, at 27-28;
Fast and FairSettlements, 2 FOR THE DEF. 49, 49 (1961).
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Many insurers responded by developing rules rather than
discretionary standards for the management of their adjusters. These
were claims management techniques designed by insurers "to protect
[themselves] against the inexperience or the incompetency of the
adjuster"1 68 while ensuring the speedy processing of a large number of
claims. 169 The aim was not to minimize the costs of any one
settlement but "to produce collectively a satisfactory return" 170 by
adopting categorical rules for claims treatment that would minimize
the sum of administrative costs and compensation costs. Automobile
cases, as H. Laurence Ross noted some time ago, were therefore
"seldom individualized" in their claims settlement treatment. Indeed,
much as rules (rather than standards) in tort doctrine systematically
aggregate through what we described at the outset of this paper as
substantive aggregation,' 71 the internal rules of liability insurers'
claims departments created strategies of procedural aggregation that
exerted powerful effects on the resolution of automobile accident
claims. In the context of automobile collisions, the seemingly infinite
array of possible accident scenarios quickly boiled down into the basic
categories of "rear-enders, red-light cases, stop sign cases, and the
like."1 72 Rules-of-thumb created rough-and-ready categories of claims,
often based in actuarial findings, such as the observation that drivers
of new cars, for example, tended to get into accidents in the third
month of ownership. 173 Braking distance and speed data gave rise to
categorical liability estimates;' 74 drivers emerging from streets
75
governed by stop signs were assumed to have been negligent;
drivers making left turns in front of oncoming traffic were assumed to
176
be liable.
While determinations of liability lent themselves relatively
readily to formulaic, on/off rules, the application of rough-and-ready
approaches to damages (including bodily injury) was an even more
168. Charles N. Sergeant, Personal Injury Claims, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.),
Nov. 1950, at 42.
169. See Ross, supra note 23, at 134 (estimating that claims adjusters handled 30-50 new
claims each month); Robert L. Lusk, The Adjuster's Dilemma, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire &
Casualty Ed.), May 1961, at 96 (explaining that adjusters "are constantly rawhided" to speed the
process).
170. ROSS, supra note 23, at 134 (emphasis added).
171. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
172. ROSS, supra note 23, at 135.
173. L. J. McCrory, The CriticalPeriod in Auto Collision, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty
Ed.), Aug. 1947, at 35.
174. Auto Accident Investigations: Simple But Valuable Calculations,8 FOR THE DEF. 10, 1011 (1967).
175. ROSS, supra note 23, at 99.

176. Id. at 101.
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significant development. Money damages are in some respects a
supremely effective technology for individuation.' 77 They are minutely
divisible to reflect the particular circumstances of the case in question.
Yet on the damages side of the equation, a similar set of
formulae shaped settlement values. The "most successful adjusters,"
as one leading adjuster noted, "have a uniform approach which has
become a habit and does not yield to the necessities of changing
circumstances."'178 By the middle of the twentieth century, claims
adjusters had adopted a number of such formulae--"bargaining
conventions" 179 or "negotiation conventions"'' 8 0 as they are called in the
scholarly literature-to deal with even the seemingly most
idiosyncratic of personal injuries. The " 'yard stick' approach...
classifie[d] injuries by their nature, each having a fixed value,
regardless of the extent thereof in an individual case."''
The "three
times three" rule multiplied the special damages of the claimant by a
factor of three. 8 2 The "Sindell formula" generated a complex points
system in which settlement value was calculated on the basis of
likelihood of liability, "type" of plaintiff, "type" of defendant, actual
losses, and the value of similar cases in the same jurisdiction.' 8 3
Actuarial life insurance tables were used from early on to calculate
lost future earnings.1 8 4 As Ross put it, even the most individualized
aspects of the claim--"the measurement of pain, suffering, and
inconvenience"-were often "thoroughly routinized" by "multiplying
the medical bills by a tacitly but generally accepted arbitrary
8
constant."' 5
Indeed, actuarial estimates of the possible exposure of the
insurer became powerfully important in shaping settlement values.
Liability insurance actuaries produced estimates of possible liability
177. Of course, a consequence of using money damages as a measure of individuation in
personal injury cases is the suggestion that money and personal injury are commensurable,
which at a deeper level undercuts the ability of money damages to individuate. See generally
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation

and Commensurability,43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993).
178. Sergeant, supra note 168, at 41.
179. Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering. A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 787 (1995).
180. Saks, supranote 81, at 1223-24.
181. Id.
182. CORYDON T. JOHNS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIABILITY CLAIMS ADJUSTING 367-68 (1965).

183. ROSS, supranote 23, at 116.
184. ROSS, supra note 23, at 239; FRANCIS TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT: A TREATISE
ON THE LAW PECULIAR TO ACTIONS FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH § 174 (1893).

185. ROSS, supra note 23, at 239. Plaintiffs' lawyers began in the middle of the twentieth
century to push for the use not of arbitrary multipliers of special damages but of per diem
multipliers. Id.
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for virtually every claim as a matter of course.18 6 Claims adjustment
departments, in turn, used these actuarially-derived reserve fund
estimates as a benchmark by which to evaluate their claims adjusters'
performance.187

To be sure, many claims adjusters contended that no formula
or yardstick could capture the value of personal injury claims.18 8
Perhaps as a form of craft pride or simply job trusting, they would
argue that each claim needed to be evaluated on its own merits.18 9
There was thus "no substitute for experience in claims handling,"
industry experts noted.1 90 And as previous students of the claims
business have noted, more individualized treatment was often the
norm in high-value, outlier claims. 91 Yet despite the presence of
outlier claims, and despite the self-interested craft arguments of the
adjusters to the contrary, the fact remains that the insurance industry
moved toward actuarial administrative models that seem to have
encompassed many of the most fact-dependent
claims of
individualized harm.
As a result, for the typical claims-the mature torts-that were
the stuff of everyday claims adjusting practice, formulae and rules-ofthumb virtually covered the field. 92 As leading claims adjuster
Corydon T. Johns noted, "the idea of an arithmetical relationship as a

186. J.H. Pittenger, Claim Reserves, BEST'S INS.NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), Apr. 1958, at
131.
187. Dudley M. Pruitt, In Reserving for Loss Claims, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.),
Jan. 1951, at 29.
188. Carr, supra note 23, at 44; Kenneth C. Berry, Individual Claim Problems, BEST'S INS.
NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), Mar. 1957, at 144.
189. Charles B. Marshall, The Most Common Mistakes, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty
Ed.), Mar. 1967, at 70 (describing the " 'rule of thumb' formulas used in various jurisdictions for
the settlement of claims" as "a true bane of the insurance profession"); Forrest S. Smith, What's a
Claim Worth?, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), Mar. 1956, at 37 (stating that "there is
no yardstick by which to measure disability evaluation; each case is a problem unto itself, to be
weighed and judged according to its own facts and circumstances").
190. Hugh D. Combs, Handling Negligence Claims, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.),
Apr. 1956, at 127.
191. ROSS, supra note 23, at 115; see also Kent D. Syverud, ADR and the Decline of the
American Civil Jury, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1935, 1943 (1997) ("The civil jury trial just is not an
affordable alternative in all but a tiny number of cases, given the cost and delay that precedes
and accompanies it.").
192. Another important source of the standardization of claims settlement practices was the
use of claims reserves built by reference to actuarial tables. As claims managers noted,
"statistical analysis of actual claims" could produce accurate predictions of aggregate claims
values, even if the value of any one claim was itself difficult to predict. Thomas E. Murrin,
Comments on Loss Reserves, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), May 1966, at 32. In turn,
actuarially-derived claims reserves were often said to drive settlement values because of
insurers' use of those reserves to evaluate the performance of claims adjusters. See supra note
187 and accompanying text.
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determiner of verdicts" was perhaps "pure myth," but it nevertheless
was "widely accepted" and thus heavily influenced the behavior of
claimants, insurers, and their agents. 193 "The myth which probably
has no reality as a verdict-predicter," Johns concluded, "is both real
and influential in the attainment of settlements, especially in
settlements made with plaintiffs' attorneys." 194 Moreover, in Johns's
view, tort law's chief claim to rationality lay in the myths and folklore
of the claims adjusters. 9 5 In any one case taken on its own terms,
there was simply no "scale of values"; "each jury is literally a law unto
itself." 196 In the aggregate, however, "The system as a whole does
present a vague consensus of value."'197 As one casualty insurance
actuary had noted some decades earlier, "statistical mass phenomena
exhibit a tendency to cluster around certain norms,"'198 and tort claims
were no different. Though the consensus was "dim" and "subject to
some doubt," it was that dim consensus about aggregate claim values
199
that drove the market in settlements.
By the late 1920s, the consequences of such claims agent
practices (though still in their infant stages) were already becoming
apparent. The well-known Columbia University study of automobile
accident injury compensation found that where defendant drivers
were insured, extremely high percentages of claims resulted in some
payment through the claims settlement process: 90 to 96 percent of
claims in Philadelphia; 71 percent of temporary disability claims and
100 percent of fatality claims in Muncie, Indiana; and so on.

193. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 378.

194. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 378; see also Geistfeld, supra note 179, at 787 (noting that
"there is no reason why actual pain and suffering injuries should be related to some multiple of
the plaintiffs economic loss" and describing the use of multipliers as a "bargaining convention");
Saks, supra note 81, at 1223-24.
195. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 2.

196. Id.
197. Id. Johns's point here is consistent with studies suggesting the extreme difficulty of
predicting liability determinations and judgment values in American tort law. KAGAN, supra
note 22, at 116, 137-39; Kritzer, supra note 121, at 817-18.
198. Arne Fisher, Written Discussion, Abstract of the Discussion of the Papers Read at the
Previous Meeting, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL AND STATISTICAL SOC'Y OF AM.

118, 121 (1918-1919).
199. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 2.

1609

2004] THE INEVITABILITY OFAGGREGATE SETTLEMENT

Closed Cases in the 1932 Columbia Study of Automobile Accident
Injury Compensation: Paid According to Severity of Injury and
Insurance Status
Closed Insured Cases

Closed Uninsured Cases

Percentage of Cases with Payments

Percentage of Cases with Payments

Temporary

Permanent

Fatal

Temporary

Permanent

Fatal

Philadelphia

90

96

93

31

33

23

New York

84

100

88

16

0

6

Terre Haute

81

90

75

22

11

0

Muncie

71

90

100

12

13

18

California

80

97

84

25

24

24

43

9

New Haven

89

90

88

42

Rural Conn.

83

100

80

36

29

0

Boston

88

94

96

5

0

0

Worcester

88

100

80

22

0

0

Totals

86

96

88

27

21

17

Source: Report by the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, to the
Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences 273 tbl.16 (1932).

As the table from the Columbia study indicates, the number of
claims paid as a percentage of the total number of claims was far
lower in precisely those cases in which the repeat-play claims agents
were not involved: the uninsured cases. To be sure, this no doubt
reflects some percentage of uninsured claims in which defendant
motorists' lack of insurance rendered them effectively judgment proof
and thus unable to pay out on large claims. 200 Nonetheless, the sharp
disparity in the number of claims for which any payment was made at
all suggests the dramatic consequences of repeat-play claims agents
for the tort system.
These consequences grew still more pronounced over time.
Increased coordination on both the defendants' side and the plaintiffs'
side came slowly at first. The Liability Insurance Association began
meeting in 1907 and was folded into the International Association of

Casualty and Surety Underwriters in 1911.201 The International
Claim Association was founded in 1909.202 The Casualty Actuarial
200. On the other hand, motorist cases will usually involve defendant drivers with at least
one asset: an automobile.
201. Agreement of "Merger" between the International Association of Casualty & Surety
Underwriters and the Liability InsuranceAssociation, 1 INT'L ASSOC. OF CASUALTY AND SURETY
UNDERWRITERS CONVENTION 17-20, 158 (1911).
202. See The International Claim Association, 35 BEST'S INS. NEWS (Casualty, Surety and
Misc. Ed.), Sept. 1934, at 257 (noting that 1934 "is the 25th ... Anniversary of the Association").
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and Statistical Society of America followed in 1914.203 In 1920, Best's
Insurance News founded its "Casualty, Surety and Miscellaneous
Edition," which published regular reports on the field of liability
insurance claims adjusting. 2 4
By the late 1920s, local claims
adjusters clubs were springing up in cities like Washington, D.C. 20 5
On the eve of the Second World War, the Federation of Insurance
Counsel brought together many of the nation's insurance lawyers. 206
And after the war, organizations like the Defense Research
Institute 2°7 and the Defense Information Office, 208 publications like
For the Defense, the Insurance Counsel Journal,and the Defense Law
Journal,20 9 and local associations such as the Defense Counsel of
Northern California and the Texas Defense Counsel 210 all coordinated
tactics among the defense bar and disseminated standard practices in
the field such as the use of rough-and-ready rules-of-thumb.
Coordinating organizations developed on the plaintiffs' side as
well, in a kind of dialectical arms race with defense organizations to
arm their constituencies with the latest strategies and information.
The National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys,
established by workmen's compensation lawyers in 1946, became the
American Trial Lawyers' Association in 1971.211 Even before its
formal renaming, the NACCA had become a clearinghouse for
information among the plaintiffs' personal injury bar, forging referral
networks and sharing information about settlement techniques,
claims valuation formulae, and the like. 212 In particular, the "King of
203. A Letter of Historical Interest, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL AND
STATISTICAL SOC'Y OF AM. 8, 8 (1914-1915) (noting the "recent inaugural dinner of the Casualty
Actuarial and Statistical Society of America").
204. Introducing the Casualty News, 21 BEST'S INS. NEWS (Casualty, Surety & Misc. Ed.),
May 1920, at 1,

1; see also Best's Recommended Insurance Attorneys, 30 BEST'S INS. NEWS

(Casualty Ed.), July 1929, at 148 (describing the ways in which Best's Insurance News
functioned as a clearinghouse for insurance adjusting, investigation, and litigation).
205. See Claim Adjusters Club of D.C. Hold Annual Meeting, 31 BEST'S INS. NEWS (Casualty

Ed.), Oct. 1930, at 424, 424 (noting that "[tihe Claims Adjusters Club ... was formed in 1928").
206. Report of the Secretary-Treasurer, 9TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE FED'N OF INS.
COUNSEL 48, 49-50 (1949).

207. The Defense Research Institute, 1 FOR THE DEFENSE 33, 33-34 (1960).
208. Defense Information Office, 2 FOR THE DEFENSE 55, 55 (1961)..
209. 1 FOR THE DEF. 1 (1960); 1 INS. COUNSEL J. 1 (1934); 1 DEFENSE L.J. 1 (1957).
210. Local Defense Organization - San Francisco, 1 FOR THE DEFENSE 41 (1960); Texas
Defense Counsel Hold First Annual Meeting, 2 FOR THE DEF. 65 (1961); see also The Work of
Local Defense Groups, 4 FOR THE DEF. 9, 9-10 (1963); Defense Association of New York, 6 FOR THE
DEFENSE 49, 49-50 (1965).

211. WITT, supra note 16, at 196.
212. See, e.g., TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1958 BELLI SEMINAR (Melvin Belli, ed. 1959)
(containing "the extended proceedings, with additional papers, of the eighth annual Belli
Seminar, August 9, 1958").
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Torts" Melvin Belli, though more famous in later years for his
flamboyant courtroom theatrics, founded a system of information
sharing, network connections, and training through the so-called Belli
Seminars that preceded the annual NACCA conferences beginning in
1951.213 As Stephen Yeazell has pointed out with respect to plaintiffs'
lawyers in more recent years, "The plaintiffs' bar, with its system of
referrals" had begun to "achiev[e] transactionally the kinds of
specialization and breadth that the corporate bar is achieving by
'2 14
growth in firm size.
Organization came hand in hand with increased specialization
among the plaintiffs' bar. By the late 1950s, students of personal
injury litigation in New York City were discovering that plaintiffs as
well as defendants were able to take advantage of a pool of specialized
repeat-play claims agents. Thirty-three specialist plaintiffs' lawyers1.8 percent of the total New York plaintiffs' bar-handled almost 13
percent of the personal injury claims in one sample. 215 Similarly, in
1960, the one hundred leading firms in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act field brought some 4,974 interstate employee injury
claims against railroads, resolving 1,556 of them in that same year for
a total of $23.5 million. 2 16 The ten leading firms resolved claims worth
$9.5 million. 217
The increased role of repeat-players on the plaintiffs' side
allowed individual claimants to spread the risk of outlier results
within a class of mature torts. Insurance claims adjusters and
claimants' agents developed some of the same kinds of relationships
that had begun at the Dwight Manufacturing Company in the 1890s,
forging settlements that took into account the ongoing relationships
between the bargaining agents. "[Y]ou might even swap cases," as one

213. Id. at iii.
214. Yeazell, supra note 9, at 202. Yeazell suggests that it is at least possible that "plaintiffs'
firms are merely lagging the rest of the bar" and that plaintiffs' lawyers will soon begin to

reorganize their practices as hierarchies rather than as markets. Id. It is also possible that the
plaintiffs' firms are ahead of the curve, not behind it, and that referral markets and horizontal
networks of practitioners may be an emerging model for law practice that elite corporate practice
(now organized in hierarchically managed firms) will one day follow. See also Erichson, supra
note 12, at 535-36. For analogies in the literature on the history and theory of the firm, see

Naomi R. Lamoreaux et. al, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of
American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404 (2003); Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin,
Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in 19th Century
Industrialization,108 PAST AND PRESENT 133 (1985).

215. Maurice Rosenberg & Michael Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1115, 1167 (1959). Interestingly, the specialist bar in New York
City was significantly less likely than the non-specialist bar to take their cases to trial. Id.
216. F.E.L.A. Specialists, 2 FOR THE DEF. 70, 70 (1961).
217. Id.
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insurance claims adjuster put it in the 1960s, "you might agree that in
this case you'll go 50 percent if such-and-such other case is settled
218
accordingly."
The settlement of mature torts by repeat-play bargaining
agents itself began to mature with the publication of verdict reporters
in the 1950s. Even as late as the 1940s, claims adjusters could look to
only a few sources for collections of verdict values. 219 But beginning in
1951 with Melvin Belli's collection of jury verdicts ("The Adequate
Award") in the California Law Review, 220 the collection and
publication of jury awards became an increasingly important part of
the functioning of the tort claims settlement market. Verdict reporters
brought into view what Corydon Johns had called the "dim consensus"
of juries and courts as to claim value. 22 1 Adjusting, in turn, was "done
in the light of this ... scale of values." 222 Settlements between repeatplay bargaining agents thus became increasingly routine and
increasingly relied on publications such as the California Jury Reports
for valuations of both settlements and trial outcomes. Indeed, the
occasional litigation of uncertain claims played the role anticipated in
the Priest-Klein model of litigation as a mechanism for testing a
judgment in the retail (trial) market in order to set wholesale
(settlement) prices. As plaintiffs' lawyer Joseph Sindell of Cleveland,
Ohio (after whom the Sindell Formula for settling cases had been
named 223) suggested:
every once and a while we will run across a case where a claim man and myself will
agree that this is the kind of case that has to go to trial, and the expression is used "to
reacting
send up a trial balloon" to see what the tenor of the time is, and how juries 2are
24
to the particular values and the injuries that they are told about and shown.

Trials, in Sindell's view, were no longer the one-sided contest between
repeat-play, deep-pocket defendants and the one-shot injured, as Marc
Galanter's well-known model would have it.225 For Sindell, occasional
resort to adjudication had become the guidepost for private settlement
markets characterized by repeat-play agents on both sides.

218. ROSS, supra note 23, at 143.

219. HOWARD L. OLECK, NEGLIGENCE INVESTIGATION MANUAL 99-100 (1953) (citing GEORGE
HIRAM PARMELE, DAMAGE VERDICTS (1927) as the best source of verdict information).

220. Melvin Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1951); see also MELVIN BELLI,
THE MORE ADEQUATE AWARD: A COLLECTION OF THE MORE ADEQUATE AWARDS TO FEB. 1952
(1952).
221. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 348.

222. Id.
223. ROSS, supra note 23, at 116.
224. TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS THROUGH 1955, at 307 (Melvin Belli, ed. 1956).

225. Galanter, supra note 107, at 97.
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The gradual emergence of a sophisticated plaintiffs' bar in the
middle decades of the twentieth century began to redress precisely the
asymmetries that Galanter's model identified. Viewed from the
snapshot of a single case, Galanter posits that the plaintiffs counsel
would be systematically at a disadvantage for three reasons. First,
they are likely drawn from the "lower echelons" of the bar, educated in
lesser law schools, and enjoy lower professional prestige. 226 Second,
they have trouble mobilizing a clientele because of "ethical" barriers
preventing solicitation and referrals. 227 Third, the "episodic and
isolated" nature of the relationship with typical one-shot clients "tends
to elicit a stereotyped and uncreative brand of legal services." 228
Galanter acknowledges the possible emergence of a coordinated bar on
the claimants' side, but discounts its likely effect. 229 Whatever the
gains in expertise and economies of scale, plaintiffs' agents, he
contends, will prove incapable "of overcoming the fundamental
strategic advantages of [repeat players]-their capacity to structure
the transaction, play the odds, and influence rule-development and
230
enforcement policy."
In the settlement markets in which lawyers like Belli and
Sindell worked, however, plaintiffs' lawyers were increasingly able to
overcome Galanter's barriers. Even prior to the modern modes of
communication that have transformed
legal practice
(and
notwithstanding the professional codes of conduct that inhibited
robust plaintiffs'-side markets in lawyers' services), the plaintiffs' bar
had begun to emerge as entrepreneurial, creative, and--dare we say it
-wealthy members of the bar. While the barriers to robust markets in
legal services remain significant even today, the increased power and
sophistication of the plaintiffs' bar in the middle of the twentieth

226. Id. at 116.
227. Id. at 116-17.

228. Id. at 117; see also Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: the Ford-Firestone
Case, the Internet, and the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-9
(2004) ("Winning a lawsuit, or reaching a settlement... [in mass harm cases), requires that a
plaintiff have enough information to establish her case. In the past, the chances of individual
consumers winning defective product claims were slim. The costs of gathering information for a
one-shot claimant and her solo practitioner attorney were prodigious and often resulted in either
a rejected suit or an agreement to settle the matter confidentially for a sum lower than
requested, perhaps lower than the true value of the claim.") (footnote omitted).

229. Galanter, supra note 107, at 118.
230. Id.
For evidence of the Galanter thesis in action, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 18701958 (1992).
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client base of
century had begun to turn a diffuse and unorganized
231
players.
repeat
facto
de
into
claimants
one-shot
The development and increased coordination of repeat-play
claimants' agents, of course, promoted considerable anguish among
certain sectors of the defense bar. Yet as some defense-side agents
noted, the presence of bargaining agents who knew the short-cuts, the
heuristics, and the rules-of-thumb often made the settlement process
considerably more efficient. 232 In Chicago, for example,' insurers found
that for precisely these reasons, the repeat-play plaintiffs'-lawyer
specialist was "an easier man to deal with than a general
Insurers dealing with such lawyers reported that
practitioner." 233
they were regularly able to strike 'package-deals"' in which they
disposed of "a great many cases at one time." 234 Indeed, together the
plaintiffs' bargaining agent and the liability insurer's claims adjuster
were, as the vice-president of one early casualty insurance
organization put it, the "lubricant" that made the law of torts "run
235
with as little friction as possible."
One result was that by the mid-1960s, automobile accident tort
claims were being settled with much greater speed than other
personal injury tort claims. Indeed, as the table below indicates, in
terms of the speed of settlement, automobile accident claims more
closely resembled workmen's compensation claims than other personal
injury claims.

231. The corollary of this aggregation is that the plaintiffs' claims are worth more as part of
a consolidated portfolio of claims in the hands of experienced counsel than they are if standing
alone in inexperienced hands. Charles Silver and Lynn Baker have focused on the gains achieved
through representation by counsel with a portfolio of similar claims to challenge one of the
vestiges of a purely individual model of representation: the aggregate settlement rule. Charles
Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement
Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1507 (1998). Under this ethical constraint, counsel must reserve
for each individual class member the ability to approve a settlement and may not condition
representation upon agreement to collective representation and ex ante approval of the best
settlement available for the entire group of claims. Id. Silver and Baker argue for bringing the
ethical rules into conformity with the collective nature of representation where, in fact,
individual claimants benefit from being part of a represented group. Id.
232. ROSS, supra note 23, at 166-67.
233. Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, Comment, 47 NW. U. L. REV.
895, 904-905 & n.48 (1953).
234. Id.
235. Address of Vice-President J. Scofield Rowe, 3 INT'L ASSOC. OF CASUALTY AND SURETY
UNDERWRITERS CONVENTION 55, 60 (1913).
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Percentage of Total Dollars Paid in Months from Date of Injury
12 Months

24 Months

36 Months

48 Months

60 Months

16

42

58

75

87

Auto Bodily Injury

26

62

81

90

95

Workmen's Compensation

35

70

83

90

92

Bodily Injury (Other Than
Auto)

Source: Thomas E. Murrin, Comments on Loss Reserves, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire &
Casualty Ed.), May 1966, at 24.

The first two lines of the table compare separate areas of the
tort system. The first, miscellaneous bodily injury, comprised an ad
hoc array of disparate, non-routinized claims. The relatively slow
speed of resolutions in this category of tort claims suggests that they
had not been successfully integrated into an efficient claims
management process. The settlement market in automobile injury
cases, by contrast, appears to have become quite efficient in terms of
speed. The striking feature is the similarity of the mature tort injury
system in auto claims to the administrative system of workmen's
compensation. The time frames in which the two claims management
processes paid out claims were remarkably close. The use of
administrative grids, whether in the public workers' compensation
system or the private auto injury system, seems to have moved both
systems toward similarly efficient resolution of claims.2 3 6 By contrast,
the non-routinized quality of the miscellaneous, non-auto bodily injury
claims category appears to have led to significant delays and
inefficiencies
in
the
search
for
individual
compensation
237
assessments.
Convergence in the relative administrative efficiency of tort
and workers' compensation is also apparent when we turn to the
compensation system. Even as private administrative processing was
making the tort settlement system more efficient, observers were
noting that claims processing in the workmen's compensation system
236. The Columbia study of automobile accident injury compensation from three decades
earlier found somewhat more delay in the settlement process, which is consistent with the
evidence indicating that the specialist plaintiffs' bar in the auto injury field became much more
robust during the 1950s. Columbia Report, supra note 57, at 282.
237. A 1986 study of auto accident dispute resolution by the RAND Corporation supports the
conclusions set out above in the text: auto cases produce more streamlined systems of dispute
resolution, with lower administrative costs and higher net recoveries as a proportion of total
costs and compensation paid, than do the miscellaneous class of undifferentiated tort disputes.
JAMES KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION x-xiii

(1986).

1616

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:5:1571

was slowing down. Claims in workers' compensation were attracting
some of the same kinds of repeat-play claims agent practice that
characterized the tort system. 23 8 Indeed, as Philippe Nonet noted of
California in the mid-twentieth century, workmen's compensation
proceedings were shifting from social work sessions organized around
claimants' needs to adversarial hearings with lawyers and claims
23 9
representatives on both sides.
Convergence between tort and public compensation systems
does not mean that the two systems were indistinguishable. 240 As in
the employers' liability context, public compensation systems such as
workers' compensation are more transparent and should ensure
greater systemic rationality in claims processing and provide more
241
publicly available information about the claims resolution system.
In the automobile context, the existence of a robust class of plaintiffs'
agents brings out a further distinction in the way in which values are
assigned to claims in the private settlement market. Workers'
compensation and other public compensation programs typically set
claims' values through a legislative process. The private settlement
market in auto claims, by contrast, sets claims values by the
occasional use of adjudication to recalibrate those values-what
242
plaintiffs' lawyer Joseph Sindell called "trial balloon" adjudication.
238. WALTER F. DODD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 314-20 (1936);
PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE; ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY
66-97 (1968); WITT, supra note 16, at 205.

239. See NONET, supra note 238; see also WITT, supra note 16, at 205.
240. For a powerful accounting of the relative merits of public compensation systems and
tort claims settlement markets, see Schuck, supra note 27, at 987-88:
The hybrid character of the mass tort system is especially striking in the context of
the global settlements in which mass tort litigation now often culminates. Indeed,
these carefully negotiated settlement plans can be viewed as more tightly drafted,
more carefully designed, more scrupulously casted, and more adequately funded
versions of administrative compensation statutes....
This, of course, is no accident; it reflects systemic differences between legislation
and contract regimes. When legislators address controversial subjects like
compensation, they employ a variety of strategic behaviors: ambiguous drafting,
deferring difficult issues, hiding or underestimating costs, and delegating norm
elaboration and implementation tasks to agencies and courts. These behaviors
magnify the notoriously high monitoring costs that any legislature faces in delegating
authority to an agency.
In contrast, litigants who negotiate a global settlement are designing a structure
to guide their relationship, manage their actual and potential conflicts, administer
their agreements, and distribute their resources over a long period of time during
which the incentives to defect may be great and resort to agencies or courts may be
costly and otherwise undesirable. Most important, the parties are putting their own
money on the line. Accordingly, they take far greater pains than do legislators in
drafting the governing document to minimize future uncertainty rather than
delegating to others the responsibility for doing so. (Footnotes omitted.)
241. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
242. See supra note 223-225 and accompanying text.
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Where workers' compensation grids in the middle of the twentieth
243
century produced notoriously static and ossified claims values,
private settlement markets in tort claims developed dynamic grids in
which claims values were constantly in flux, responding to changes in
the judgment value of the claims in question. 244 As defense lawyer
Philip J. Hermann noted in 1962, "[J]ury verdicts change to conform
245
It
with conditions and attitudes that change with the times."
followed that the "tables" which Hermann and others put to use in
settling tort claims "are continuously being revised to reflect these
246
changes."
Yet despite these important differences between private claims
settlement practices and public compensation systems, it is no wonder
that loss adjusters working on tort claims in the 1950s saw a "trend in
claims ...headed in the direction of specifically charted benefits" and
24 7
away from the individualized awards of the negligence system.
With respect to questions of individuation and aggregation, the
marketplace for the settlement of the ordinary tort claims, which we
243. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1972)

244. On our account, it should not be surprising to find trials used as a "pricing" mechanism
in many areas of law in which repeat players need to benchmark their settlement practices. For
example, Nancy King and Rosevelt Noble report a Kentucky criminal defense lawyer recounting
discussions between defense lawyers and prosecutors in which "sometimes both parties will say,
we haven't tried an X case in a while. Let's see what a jury says, they take it to trial. They use it
to set a benchmark that they'll use in negotiations later on." Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble,
Felony Sentencing in Practice,A Three-Judge Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 953-54 n. 217 (2004).
245. Philip J. Hermann, PredictingVerdicts in PersonalInjury Cases, 475 INS. L. J. 505, 515
(1962).
246. Id. The dynamism of the private settlement grids generated in American automobile
injury practice suggests a useful comparison to the Japanese system of automobile injury
compensation. In Japan, an influential group of judges handling auto cases in the 1960s created
a set of standardized liability and damages rules much like those created in the American claims
market, complete with damages rules-of-thumb and "charts setting out the most common
accident scenarios." Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial
Activism in Japan, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 19, 27-28 (1995). Once in place, these rules-of-thumb and
standardized damages rules produced extraordinarily high settlement rates and a sharp drop off
in auto injury litigation. Just as in the U.S., "the remaining cases that reached the court,"
Professor Foote observes, "were by and large atypical cases that could not easily be resolved by
reference to standards." Id. at 30. An important difference between the judicially-created
Japanese standards and the dynamic market-based standards in the U.S. system, however, is
that the Japanese damages standards were quickly eroded by inflation during the 1970s, much
as U.S. workers' compensation awards had suffered during the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 33.
Damages standards in the American tort claims settlement market, by contrast, were in a much
better position to respond to exogenous shocks such as inflation. Many thanks to Curtis Milhaupt
for pointing us to this analogy.
247. Charles Gable, Casualty Loss Adjustments, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.),
Apr. 1950, at 38; see also Hermann, supra note 245, at 516 (stating that "the information now
known should enable attorneys and insurance companies to do business in personal injury cases
on a sound actuarial basis much like life expectancy tables are now used.").
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have dubbed "mature torts," had come to operate much like the public
compensation system that had replaced it in the field of work
accidents.
III. INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AGGREGATED SETTLEMENT IN
MATURE TORTS

Beginning in the late nineteenth century-virtually coincident
with the emergence of the law of torts itself-one can see the
emergence of a rough sequence of mature torts that gave rise to
aggregated settlement institutions. Work accidents, followed by the
early mass disasters and then automobile accidents each provided a
new stage on which repeat players emerged to manage the resolution
of personal injury disputes.
Three defining features from the historical experience
characterize a mature body of tort law, as we are using the term.
First, market pressures and the benefits to be gained from economies
of scale seem to lead to the concentration of market share on both the
plaintiff and defense sides into a small number of repeat actors.
Second, as patterns of liability and damages stabilize, trials seem to
become increasingly exceptional as claims are handled through
routinized negotiations between established representatives. Third,
mature torts seem to evolve grid structures for the actuarial
treatment of accident claims.
What happens if we bring the analytic framework of these
three defining characteristics to bear on the asbestos claims market?
Although we could point to any number of mass harms in which
claims are settled thousands at a time, 248 asbestos remains the
paradigmatic case. Thirty years have passed since the threshold legal
determination that asbestos manufacturers would be strictly liable for
exposure-related illnesses and death, 249 and more than two decades
since the popular revelations of the health hazards of asbestos and the
systemic efforts to suppress critical information about those
hazards. 250 There is by now little doubt that asbestos harms and the
subsequent asbestos litigation are an enormous weight both upon the
court system and upon the economy. Hundreds of thousands of
asbestos cases clog the courts, with total corporate liability estimated

248. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy
in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 534-35 (describing the
prevalence of such mass claims Norplant, Fen-Phen, and similar mass harm cases).
249. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1973).
250. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEIOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985).
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to exceed $200 billion. 251 Since the initial insolvency of Johns
Manville in 1982,252 scores of firms have gone into bankruptcy as a
result of asbestos liabilities, and virtually no asbestos producers are
still in business. 253 It is also beyond question that asbestos is a public
health calamity of major proportions. Approximately 20 million
workers suffered occupational exposure in the U.S., some 250,000
have died from that exposure, and hundreds of thousands more have
exposure-based illnesses. 254 Beyond the sheer numbers, asbestos has
served as the focus for the Supreme Court's most important
pronouncements on the procedural dimension of mass torts in
Amchem and Ortiz. 255 It was, after all, in overturning a proposed
massive asbestos settlement that Justice Souter invoked the day-incourt ideal and expressed skepticism that lawyers holding huge
inventories of individual cases could ever provide adequate
25 6
representation.
When we test our three historically-derived hypotheses against
asbestos litigation, we do indeed find concentrations of claims in
particular claimants' agents, very few trials, and standardized
treatment of settlement amounts. Our aim, however, is not simply to
challenge the Supreme Court's idealized world of individual justice.
Focusing on the unexceptional features of class action aggregation in
mature torts practice casts in clearer light two features that do
distinguish the current mass tort cases from their predecessors in the
field of mature torts.
First, the use of the class action as a vehicle for crafting
aggregate settlements ushers in exclusivity of representation. No
matter how concentrated the market in claims, no matter how
centralized dispute resolution may have been in the hands of a
translator or other early claims broker, there was always some
capacity for a rival representative to challenge the merits of the deals
offered. Anti-competitive bar association disciplinary rules, such as
prohibitions on advertising and bans on claims-running, posed
obstacles to competition in the claims representation market, but the
251. Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-DollarCrisis, 30
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 393 (1993); Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice,
FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002, at 154.
252. In re Johns Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
253. See Deborah H. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1899 (2001) ("As a result of [asbestos litigation], more than forty
corporations have filed for insolvency or reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.").
254. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 631 (1997).
255. See generally,Amchem, 521 U.S. 591; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
256. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846-48.
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potential challenge of competition among claims agents existed
nonetheless. Placing exclusive rights of representation in class
representatives and class counsel, however, serves as an extreme
barrier to entry, complicating any challenge to settlement agent
misconduct.
Second, whether on the factory floor or in the insurance-driven
world of auto accidents, the cost of injury, once routinized, was built
into the cost of doing business on a going-forward basis. Firms
continued to produce notwithstanding employers' liability; cars
continued to roll off assembly lines in the face of products liability for
auto manufacturers. In theory, such liabilities prompted increased
safety measures as firms internalized the cost of accidents into the
costs of doing business.
By contrast, while asbestos litigation shares the central
characteristics of the repeat accident cases, it also involves injuries on
a scale too great and with latency periods too long to be internalized
going forward. Sometimes this results from harm that simply exceeds
the capacity of the firm to withstand judgments, as with the
bankruptcy of A.H. Robbins because of the Dalkon Shield IUD
litigation. In other instances, as with many asbestos manufacturers, a
single harmful product so dominates the economic activity of a
particular firm that the withdrawal of that product from the market
dooms the enterprise. Under such circumstances, not only is the scope
of the potential harm likely to dwarf the resources of the negligent
firm, but the potential for latent harms makes even a guess at the
257
projected liabilities a hazardous enterprise.
Monopolistic representation and long-tail, firm-killing liability
-not aggregation and not the day-in-court ideal-are the features
that distinguish the class action from the practices that have long
characterized American tort law. We conclude with a discussion of
what we take to be the lessons of Amchem and Ortiz, focusing on these
unique features of the class action.
A. The Market for Asbestos Claims
As we set out at the beginning, the day-in-court ideal invoked
by Justice Souter in Ortiz presupposes the bipolarity of litigation, as
the tort scholars would have it. To focus on bipolarity in the context of
asbestos, however, is to miss the point. While it is certainly true that
257. The best data emerge from the broad gulf between the 150,000 claims initially projected
against the Manville Trust and actual claims to date, which number ten times as many. See
Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked" Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and
Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (2002) (providing data on Manville claims).
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any individual's particular exposure, injury, and disease pathology
could play out at trial along the customary tort lines of duty, breach,
causation, and damages, the sheer volume of claims defines this
drama. An estimated 10,000 Americans still die each year from
asbestos-related diseases, a number that is expected to hold constant
for the next decade. 258 Perhaps even more significant for the prospects
of individual litigation, approximately forty firms have gone into
bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation, 2 59 forcing all potential
claimants into aggregated workouts regardless of hopes for a private
day in court. In a system where so many claims raising similar issues
compete for the limited resources of a few enterprises, and in which
trials cost so much, such claims cannot be widely dispersed among
individual lawyers, each representing one plaintiff. Indeed, such a
system does not exist. Asbestos cases have even generated claim and
client aggregation on the defense counsel side. One need look no
further than the record in Amchem to find that the ultimately failed
national settlement was negotiated between a handful of plaintiffs'
lawyers claiming a significant percentage of the asbestos cases on the
one hand, and a consortium of asbestos manufacturer defendants on
the other. The joint asbestos defense enterprise organized around the
Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) 260 functions as the state-of-the-art
reincarnation of the Railroad Attorneys' Conference of 1906.261
While both the plaintiffs' and defense bars in mass harm cases
such as asbestos gravitate toward the concentration of claims in a few
hands, this is accomplished in different ways. In the defense context,
one or more powerful institutional actors select lawyers to serve as
organizers of their defense across a large number of cases. 262 Through
in-house counsel or through an oversight law firm, these institutional
actors (like the Dwight Manufacturing Company a century ago)
readily discern the aggregate nature of the claims against them.
Indeed, the disclosure requirements of modern financial markets have
made the aggregate character of mass torts all the more apparent.
Insurers, the Security and Exchange Commission, investment banks,
accounting firms, and many of the other financial intermediaries with
258. JoAnne Allen, Study Warns U.S. FacingAsbestos Crisis, (March 9, 2004) (reporting on a
report by the Environmental Working Group), available at http:lwww.asbestostoday.com/newsl
000004.html.
259. DEBORAH HENSLER, ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW
LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE, PRELIMINARY RESEARCH RESULTS,
14 (2001), available at

http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB362.0/DB362.0.pdf.
260. 521 U.S. at 599-601.
261. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
262. For a description of the various techniques of coordination used by defense firms, see
Erichson, supra note 12, at 401-08.
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which firms routinely do business typically require overall risk
assessments as to liability exposure. In turn, accountants and
actuaries estimate potential liabilities from firm- and industry-wide
data on type of use of asbestos, on the years of exposure, and on the
state of employee industrial protections as awareness of risk
263
improved.
Coordination on the plaintiffs' side is more difficult. Unlike the
accident markets of old, contemporary mass harms are likely to have
nationwide impact. The simple face-to-face and word-of-mouth
strategies that worked to create networks of claimants in
Massachusetts textile mills, Wisconsin dam breaks, and Tennessee
coal mine explosions are unlikely to achieve the consolidation
necessary for the effective management of mass harm cases on the
plaintiffs' side. The sophisticated epidemiological studies and other
costly undertakings typical to such cases all too often overwhelm
relatively isolated local plaintiffs' counsel. While certain pioneers of
centralized information, such as Melvin Belli, foresaw the need for
these approaches, communication and information-sharing were
significant barriers. Routine access to fax machines dates back only a
little more than two decades, and electronic transmission of data goes
back only one decade as an integral part of legal practice. In asbestos,
for example, only an external shock brought about the initial national
coordination among the leading plaintiffs' firms. As the central
plaintiffs' lawyer in Amchem and Ortiz observed:
it was only when we arrived at the Manville bankruptcy hearings [in 1982 or so] and
saw lawyers from all over the country pursuing the same cases with the same issues
that we realized that we needed a nationwide strategy. We realized that Manville
had a
264
nationwide approach to the cases and that we needed to have one as well.

Even before asbestos, the plaintiffs' bar had made a number of
halting but significant steps toward specialization and the bundling of
claims to amortize costs. Howard Erichson quotes one leading
plaintiffs' lawyer aptly summing up the bottom line: "If you can't sign
up enough plaintiffs, the economics don't work. ' 265 As bar association
263. See, e.g., Susan L. Cross & John C. Doucette, Measurement of Asbestos Bodily Injury
Liability, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL Soc'y F., Summer
1994, at
189, available at
www.casact.org/pubs/forum; Kevin M. Madigan & Claus S. Metzner, Reserving for Asbestos
Liability, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOc'y FORUM (Casualty Actuarial Society, Arlington, VA), Fall
2003, at 193-208, at www.casact.org/pubs/forum. There is a burgeoning market in econometric
studies of mass tort liability for firms and their insurers. For promotional literature of leading
economic consulting firm advertising proprietary analyses for forecasting future product liability
exposure of an enterprise, see Brochure, National Economic Research Associates, Product
Liability and Mass Torts Valuation 4-5 (2004), available at http:l/nera.comlimage/6501.pdf.
264. Interview with Joseph F. Rice, Attorney, Motley Rice LLC, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 7,
2002).
265. Erichson, supra note 12, at 547 (quoting Alexander MacDonald).
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rules on referrals and advertising were liberalized, the plaintiffs' bar
began to divide between firms that actually handled cases and those
that served primarily as the initial contact for plaintiffs, often the
What has
photogenic entrepreneurs of late-night television. 266
emerged is a widespread "hub-and-spoke structure in which referring
lawyers remain involved in a limited capacity in their clients' cases,
serving as the primary client contact, while the lawyer to whom the
cases are referred performs the bulk of the work in litigation and
negotiation. 267 The law has evolved to the point that lawyers who
refer work to each other may, in some jurisdictions, claim quantum
meruit recovery for the value of their services, even absent contractual
268
agreement from the client.
Specialization and concentration, however, are double-edged
swords. While a mature tort with clear liability rules and relatively
settled expectations of damages rewards the entrepreneurial skill of
the aggregators of claims, the earlier stages of untested mass harm
claims pose grave risks for the initial bundlers of claims. Few
individual plaintiffs' firms in the early years of plaintiffs'-side
aggregation in mature torts could withstand the potential risk of
investing sufficiently to challenge a defendant whose existence might
be on the line in a mass harm case. A firm that specialized in a highrisk new tort claim and invested the resources necessary to develop
the litigation potential of the claim would find itself in violation of the
basic portfolio precepts of any Finance 101 course, or the more
quotidian admonition not to put all your eggs in one basket. The lack
of diversification and the sheer magnitude of the risk created the
kinds of pressures toward quick (and cheap) settlement identified in
269
some of the academic commentary.
A second step in plaintiffs'-side aggregation emerged in the
aftermath of the Manville bankruptcy and accelerated through
the litigation
technology:
improvements in communications
266. Referral fees are a traditional source of controversy, as with the current proposed rule
8a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in which referrals are associated with claims runners
and the frowned-upon practices of trolling for claims - vilified as the practices of the ambulance
chaser. The historic origins of the practice are actually more complicated and may reflect the
split nature of the bar in England, with referring country solicitors, managing town solicitors,
and barristers, all of whom shared in the resulting fees. JULES H. COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR
PROFESSION? 226 (1916); Thomas J. Hall & Joel C. Levy, Intra-Attorney Fee Sharing
Arrangements, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976).
267. Erichson, supra note 12, at 536.
268. Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 84 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2004).
269. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 112, at 1363-64; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
Sweetheart and Blackmail Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L.

REV. 1377, 1378 (2000); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 430 (2000).
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consortium. 270 Either formally through the Multi-District Litigation
process, or informally through private agreement, or more likely
through both, plaintiffs' firms undertook joint ventures to pool risk
and capitalize expensive litigation efforts. The by-product was further
coordination and concentration of related claims. In a sense, the
plaintiffs'-side litigation consortium is the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century maturation of the consolidations that we observed
going back to the nineteenth century.
In the case of asbestos, the result is a highly concentrated
market in which roughly ten firms account for more than 50 percent of
the asbestos claims in the country and fifty firms effectively control
the market. 271 The best documentation comes from the Manville
Trust, which has the longest history of public accounting for the
processing of asbestos claims. According to Manville Trust documents,
fifty-five firms represent approximately 85 percent of all claimants to
Trust assets. 272 Similarly, the most recent Rand Institute study of
asbestos litigation reports approximately the same number of firms
controlling the same percentage of the docket today. 273
An interesting illustration of the effect of the centralization
and coordination of the plaintiffs' bar comes from the venturesome, if
ultimately doomed, effort of Owens Corning to protect itself from
insolvency. Under the innovative National Settlement Program,
general counsel Maura Abeln Smith sought to use the concentration of
the plaintiffs' bar to create a sustainable cash flow for asbestos
claims. 274 Smith first arranged for the acquisition of Fibreboard by
Owens Corning to create, in effect, the largest concentration of
asbestos liability since the bankruptcy of Johns Manville. 275 Smith
then negotiated a structured workout of yearly claims with a cash flow
cap for any given year. 276 Plaintiffs' firms with large inventories
would then have had incentives to avoid busting the bank on any large
judgment, and to bring all new claimants into the settlement
structure, for fear that a bankruptcy of the newly minted Owens

270. The evolution is discussed in Erichson, supra note 12, at 546-47.
271. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1930; STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2002).

272. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1930 n.21 (quoting Manville Trust General Counsel
David Asutern, presenting at Seminar on Contemporary Controversies in Complex Litigation,
Columbia Law School, Apr. 4, 2002).
273. CARROLL ET AL., infra note 278.

274. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1933 n. 39
275. George M Cohen, The "Fair"is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. and
ClassAction Settlements, 8 SUPREME COURT EcON. REV. 23, 88 n. 167 (2000).

276. This parallels what was attempted in both Amchem and Ortiz.
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Corning Fibreboard would compromise the yearly payment stream to
thousands of their existing clients.
The Owens-Corning plan sought to return the mass tort
asbestos cases to the ongoing basis of earlier mass harm experiences
such as the work accident toll of a century ago, and to do so without
the class action device. The plan ultimately failed. 277 Absent the
coercive powers associated with class action status, adverse-selection
effects kept the high-end cases out of the deal. But what is significant
for our purposes is just how concentrated the bulk of the asbestos bar
proved to be--in effect, the centralization of plaintiffs' claims was the
predicate for Smith's bold gambit. According to Smith, to settle
176,000 claims-nearly 90 percent of the claims pending against OCF
-she needed to negotiate with only fifty law firms, something she was
able to accomplish in the short space of two months. 278
B. The DisappearingTrial
In the real world of asbestos, the "day-in-court ideal" of Ortiz is
the rare exception. There is no doubt that asbestos claims are flooding
the courts. By one estimate in 1994, fifty new asbestos cases were
being filed each day in the U.S.279 Estimates suggest that the total
number of claims is likely to reach as high as 2.5 million before the
epidemic recedes. 280 But the press of litigation should not be confused
with large numbers of trials. According to data collected by the Rand
Institute, between 1993 and 2001, despite hundreds of thousands of
cases on file, many actively litigated, there were a grand total of 527
trial verdicts involving 1598 plaintiffs in the entire country. 28 ' This is
an average of about sixty asbestos trials a year.
C. Administrative Damage Models
The "day-in-court" ideal is further complicated by the rise of
damage models that diverge from the norm that individualized justice
should inform the disposition of mature tort claims. 28 2 Among the
most notable trends is the rise of administrative grids similar to those
used in workers' compensation and auto accidents to manage

277. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1937-1938.
278. See Hensler, supranote 253, at 1913; Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1937.
279. Hensler, supra note 253, at 1900.
280. Alex Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2002, at Al.
281. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 273.
282. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1936.
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settlements. Since Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 28 3 the use of such
grids--despite significant legal challenges--has come to represent the
tool of choice for plaintiffs' attorneys pursuing mature asbestos
28 4
claims.
Cimino was the first attempt to bring the valuation grids used
in workers' compensation and other mature repeat claims into the
aggre'ate trial resolution of a class of all pending claims in the
Eastern District of Texas. 28 5 The experiment turned on the ability to
jump-start a stalled market in asbestos claims by filling in directly the
valuations for each cell in a damages grid. What had been the norm in
mature areas of tort claims, such as the industrial accidents and auto
cases that we have previously discussed, was now brought out into the
open as an experimental trial mechanism. To accomplish this end, in
Cimino, each plaintiffs claim was reduced to a common set of
variables often used in settling cases such as length of exposure,
severity of disease, and the plaintiffs smoking history. The proposed
plan of aggregation would then have categorized all class members to
establish classes of claims and in turn to select representative cases
for trial from among the general mass of cases then pending in
Eastern District of Texas. 28 6 Special trials of representative claims
would then have been held to establish a set of benchmark or model
valuations for each class of claims.
28 7
Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected this approach,
Cimino brought to light previously private settlement practices of
evolved tort markets. Having been brought into the open and adopted
by at least one court, Cimino-styled grids have now been integrated
into every important attempt to craft a litigation-based workout of the
asbestos mess. 28 8 In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, for example,
CCR (which coordinated settlements on behalf of twenty major
283. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
284. Id. On the evidentiary sources, see Peter Blanck & Micheal Saks, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV.
815 (1992); Laurens Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve Federal Class Action Cases by Jury Trial,
88 VA. L. REV. 405 (2002). For an account of the theory of the Cimino case, sampling trial
strategy, see generally Shari Diamond et. al., Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical
Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1998); Michael Saks,
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - and Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Jack Ratliff, Special Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark
Industries, 10 REV. LITIG. 521 (1991).
285. One of the authors worked as a special master in the design of the Cimino trial model.
Samuel Issacharoff, AdministeringDamages in Mass Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 463, 463 n. a
(1991).
286. Id. at 464.
287. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 710-11 (1990).
288. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1936-40.
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asbestos defendants) developed injury matrices using the same
criteria as in Cimino.28 9 Calculating from historic averages for each
injury grid point, CCR then discounted to reflect the fact of
settlement. 290 A similar approach was later incorporated in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard,where structured settlements of Fibreboard served as a
template for assigning value to present and future claims against the
291
trust negotiated and agreed upon in case.
Grids do not in themselves produce settlement. 292 Plaintiffs,
defendants, and insurance providers will often not come to the
settlement table unless a mass tort is "sufficiently mature so that all
the players had some common estimation of the value of the
underlying individual tort claims." 293 Indeed, detailed knowledge of
the nature of the claim agreement on a claim's value is often a crucial
variable not only for plaintiffs, but also for defendants, in inducing
294
momentum for a settlement class.
Myriad factors have contributed to-and continue to informthe routinized valuation of claims, particularly in the asbestos context.
Lawyer specialization is perhaps the least surprising. 295 As trial
lawyers become more experienced in trying cases, they become more
296
adept at assessing injuries and the value of those injuries at trial.
Some of this expertise comes from the personal experience
attributable to successful lawyers' development: as lawyers become
repeat players, they come to better understand the science behind a
particular injury, as well as the risks and chances of success of
pursuing different litigation strategies. 297 With better information,
claim valuation paradoxically becomes more accurate as a gauge of
settlement values in the claims market, even as it becomes more

289. 521 U.S. at 599-604.
290. Id.
291. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1937.
292. Some commentators have focused on the use of grids not only to establish valuations for
those with compensable injuries, but also to limit recoveries to claimants unable to manifest
harms. See George L. Priest, ProceduralVersus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions,
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 545 (1997) ('Many features of modern class actions which seem to violate
procedural values may serve to better align class action outcomes with the substantive goals of
tort law."); Nagareda, supra note 117, at 763-67 (focusing on the ability of grids to exclude, for
example, those with exposure but no impairment).
293. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 633 (1997).
294. Id.
295. THOMAS WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 21 (Federal Judicial Center 1987).
296. Id. (noting that "[o]rganization of lawyers into specialists promotes simplification" as
"[elvaluations of cases and development of settlement formulae become easier").
297. Id. (explaining that a reduction of parties to a litigation leads to simplification of the
litigation process because parties deal with one major adversary on a repeated basis).
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standardized through the application of rules-of-thumb and
settlement grids. Significantly, an attorney's trial experience may play
ofly a minor role in the routinization of claims valuation, particularly
given the small number of cases that actually go to trial in a mass
harm as well matured as asbestos. More important is the expanding
universe of auxiliary service providers who collect and disseminate the
information lawyers use to value claims in what has become a nearly
$200 billion industry. 298 As the roster of potential defendants has
expanded beyond first-line asbestos manufacturers to include bluechip companies, insurance companies, and re-insurers, a vast
supporting cast has arisen to provide information to plaintiffs' and
°°
defendants' claims agents. 299 Outsourced actuaries and economists,3
as well as accounting firms, 30 1 provide important information for
plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers about claim valuation, risk of
liability, and adverse court decisions. In the process, they guide
parties towards efficient disposition of claims.
On both the plaintiff and defendant side of settlement disputes,
economic consulting firms estimate the aggregate extent of future and
pending economic liability facing companies and insurers. 30 2 They use
various "top down" and "bottom up" actuarial strategies to analyze the
aggregate risk environment facing companies and individual asbestos
defendants. Top down analysis evaluates the number of plaintiff
personal injury filings through epidemiological analysis of the disease
in question. It accounts for personal experiences and claimants'
mortality rates. It also examines average indemnity awards by disease
and future trends in order to help insurance companies retain
sufficient reserves for remaining solvent. Bottom up analysis involves
the construction of databases of defendant experience by tier and
incorporates information such as number of filings and average

298. Michael E. Angelina & Jennifer L. Biggs, Sizing up Asbestos Exposure, 3 EMPHASIS 26
(Tower Perrin Companies Journal), 26, (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.towersperrin
.com /tillinghastIpublications/publications
/emphasis/Emphasis_20013/2002041814.pdf.
299. Issacharoff, supra note 257, at 1931.
300. See, e.g., http://www.nera.com, a web page provided by NERA, economic consultants,
advertising both economic and actuarial services for law firms, companies, insurers and
reinsurers in calculating asbestos liability and supporting commercial litigation [hereinafter
NERA].
301. Here large accounting firms have developed considerable practices offering services
designed to assist insurers and other companies in understanding their asbestos liability both in
and out of the litigation context. See, e.g., PriceWaterhouseCoopers' actuarial and insurance
management web page, at http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/service.nsf/docid/48FBB9EA
28AE371085256C6C000A13 (noting the firm's assistance in claim validation in the context of
insurance coverage or reinsurance contract disputes and settlement agreements).
302. See supra notes 261-265 and accompanying text.
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indemnity by degrees of severity, as well as expense to indemnity
30 3
ratios.
As in the formulation of settlement grids, such forecasts adopt
a routinized accounting of individual factors in assessments of claim
viability and value. Forecasts comprise an estimation of the number of
people ever exposed to asbestos, as well as the rate at which they sue
(as well as the causes for the rate). 3° 4 Thus, one part of the analysis
involves
exposure--often
carried
out
by
epidemiologists,
demographers, and even dermatologists-to evaluate the causes and
distribution of diseases.30 5 Next, forecasters extrapolate the rate at
30 6
which individual subsets sue and their probability of success.
Factors include duration of exposure, age of the plaintiff, and smoking
habits.3 0 7 Elderly patients usually receive lower awards in settlement
given their shorter life expectancy. 308 Similarly, smokers will be less
likely to succeed against an asbestos defendant because of the likely
causal role of tobacco and widespread jury beliefs that smokers bear
30 9
some responsibility for their own predicament.
Such claims evaluation processes elaborate on actuarial
practices that arose in the insurance industry in the mid-twentieth
century. More than fifty years ago, actuaries' estimates of insurers'
exposure for the purposes of creating reserve funds were used as
310
mechanisms for monitoring the work of insurance claims adjusters.
Today, economists and other consultants make much more
sophisticated forecasts available to defense lawyers. And though the
forecasts are most often used to predict claims totals and aggregate
exposure, they are regularly incorporated into claims and litigation
strategies just as the claims reserves estimates shaped the settlement
311
strategies of an earlier generation of insurance claims adjusters.
Less dramatically, comparisons among jury verdicts make it
possible to take the routinization of claims to individual cases. Large
consulting firms do this for client law firms, 312 though it may also be
303. Angelina & Biggs, supra note 298.
304. Id.
305. Brochure, supra note 263, at 4.
306. Frederick C. Dunbar, ForecastingMass Tort and Liability Claims 31 VIEWPOINT (The
Marsh McLennan Companies Journal) 9, 11 (concluding that "forecasters quantify the causeand-effect relationships of the principals in mass torts" to make accurate predictions of future
claims), available at http://nera.com/image/5393.pdf.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 15.
310. See supra notes 218-223 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Brochure, supra note 263, at 4..
312. Id. at 5-6.
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carried out by individual lawyers. The electronic reference guide
"What's it Worth" provides through Lexis a wide range of data as to
the market value of various injuries due to asbestos. 313 Through this
service, a plaintiffs lawyer can discover in seconds various jury
verdicts against defendants in, for example, asbestosis claims brought
by working class carpenters and laborers. Short profiles then provide
3
a baseline for appraisals of the value of individual claims in dispute. 14
These electronic databases provide up-to-the-minute information for
lawyers in prosecuting their claims or defending their clients. In short,
they behave like analysts for investment banks: they provide
information for specialists to apply their expertise and make a "bid" or
offer to which a counter-party responds.
Professional organizations further aid in disseminating
information. Where once individual entrepreneurs like Belli ran
seminars for plaintiffs' lawyers, now Mealey's, a for-profit
clearinghouse, offers seminars on asbestos litigation. 3 15 Individual
sessions focus entirely on the valuation of claims, as well as on
techniques that heighten plaintiffs' chances of success. 3 16 Results of
the conference are then available for purchase nationwide to
3 17
interested members of the bar.
The same consulting firms that forecast claims also model the
litigation decision process itself, comparing the costs and benefits to
defendants of alternative litigation strategies. 318 Furthermore, the
growth of claims management facilities on the defense side has led to
not only the reporting and analysis of claims, but also a one-stop
online resource for outsourced settlement negotiation. 319 These
administration services also provide historical data reconciliation and
conversions, thus providing defendants with their own baselines for
320
monitoring claims, estimating their value, and preventing fraud.
As a result, there is now a predictable pattern to the mass
workouts that accompany mass harms. Peter Schuck argues that the
313. See LEXIS database, available at www.lexis.com.
314. Such an approach was presaged by Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Anderson, Collective
Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1492 (1992) (recommending the use of statistical claim
profiles to set baseline appraisals of the value of individual claims).
315. See, e.g., MEALEY'S ASBESTOS LITIGATION 101 CONFERENCE (Feb. 23-24, 2004), audio

recording available at http://mealeys.com/conferences_ontape.html.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See NERA, supra note 300.
319. See, e.g., http://www.navigantconsulting.com/A559B1/navigant.nsf/fCNTDspMain
?OpenForm&Catl=Galt2&Cat2=Page6&Cat3=Subl(demonstrating the services provided by
the Navigant claims facilities).
320. Id.
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predictability of the form of mass tort settlement structures is itself
evidence of the maturation of the field of mass torts:
Global settlements provide strong evidence that contemporary mass tort litigation has
evolved into a far more coherent and efficient system than its predecessors. All global
settlements tend to follow the same general pattern. Imitation being the sincerest form
of flattery, this suggests that mass tort litigation has engendered a relatively successful
mechanism of dispute resolution. Experiences of litigators, courts, and claims facilities
in negotiating and administering global settlements are being accumulated and
integrated into patterned, recurrent, and increasingly predictable forms.
As a result,
321
new settlements are likely to employ variations on now-familiar themes.

D. The Class Action as Hybrid between Litigation and Administration
Although the claims settlement process in asbestos and other
contemporary mass torts resembles in many respects the basic
patterns of claims aggregation apparent from the very beginnings of
American tort law, there are two critical differences. Significantly,
neither of them emerges from either the fact of aggregation or the
reality of settlement. Those are and have been the norms in any
developed area of tort law.
First, the class action confers a state-created monopoly on
representation. 322 In the historical examples of aggregation through
market forces, legal barriers to entry for rivals in the market for
representation were only partially realized. To be sure, many features
of legal practice created obstacles that impeded the free flow of
information to potential claimants. For example, there are and have
been prohibitions on lawyer advertising, or the identification of
possible cases by claims runners, or the inability to incentivize private
parties through fee-sharing agreements. Whether we examine the
translators in immigrant factory communities or the consolidators of
streetcar accidents, the market placed some (admittedly imperfect)
constraints on agent opportunism. Too much collusion, too high a fee,
and suddenly market rivals would appear. Unlike the coordination on
the defense side through contract, the certification of a class confers
exclusivity of representation on a non-contractual basis. In turn, the
exclusivity of the class action defeats the markets in mature claims
32 3
that have so long characterized American tort law.

321. Schuck, supra note 27, at 962.
322. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148, U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2145-48 (2000) (arguing that class actions are state-enabled litigation).
323. Because of the potential for market alternatives, it is easier to fit even mass
representation within a traditional attorney-client contractual relation than it is in class actions.
See Nagareda, supra note 117, at 768 (Although there may be "little or no supervision of
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In this light, the real insight of the Supreme Court's asbestos
cases is not the invocation of individualized justice but the insistence
324
in both Amchem and Ortiz on "structural assurances of fairness,
something that would seem an odd concern were the Court really to
have sought to restore individualized norms of representation. This
focus on fairness rather than individuation helps to explain recent
reforms such as securing a second chance to opt out of a proposed class
action settlement. 325 It also reinforces the centrality of accountability
and other governance norms as the key to the settlement class
action. 326 The erosion of market checks on inadequate representation
and the role of the state in conferring a binding structure formally
align the settlement class action more closely to the administrative
models than the sometimes robust, sometimes anemic, private tort
markets of old. 327 The need to focus on the incentives facing
representatives in the absence of potential market challenges to class
counsel is well captured by Richard Nagareda:
The point [of class action law] is not to preserve some idealized day in court for
individual class members. The goal instead is to discern a set of principled and
institutionally appropriate checks upon the
exercise of monopoly power by class counsel
328
over the representation of class members.

Accordingly, "An understanding of the class action as a
monopoly naturally raises the question of how to discipline the
exercise of monopoly power by class counsel. '329 Using a single-shot
trial as the appropriate baseline for comparison has all the allure of

plaintiffs' counsel by the client in mass representation, the consensual nature of the attorneyclient relationship nonetheless is what gives aggregate settlements their legitimacy.").
324. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 595 (1997); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855 (1999).
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). See also John Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 377-79
(2000) (giving theoretical account for why the opportunity for relational exit promotes agent
loyalty). Even this small increment in individual autonomy has been criticized as an efficiency
loss for the class action resolution of broad-scale harms. David Rosenberg, Adding A Second OptOut To Rule 23(B)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 200 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19 (2003).
326. See Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, supra note 112, at 818 ("[Tjhe issue in
legitimately litigated class action settlements is to develop a halfway point that allows
assurances of fairness while at the same time not burdening the settlement process so
completely that it breaks down of its own weight."); see generally, Nagareda, supra note 117, at
782-83 (discussing fairness in settlement claims).
327. For attempts to impose models of administrative legitimacy on the settlement class, see
Nagareda, supra note 117, at 751-52 (agreeing that different settlements have their own
nuances, but arguing that all aspire to create some form of private administrative system that
would pay compensation to claimants according to a pre-established grid.).
328. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUMBIA. L. REV. 149, 168 (2003).

329. Id.
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trying to understand Microsoft by reference to a street-corner
lemonade stand.
Second, the inability of many firms to internalize the costs of
mass torts on a going-forward basis requires settlements that close out
future liabilities. It is therefore not surprising that the most difficult
features of mass tort class actions deal with future claimants, whether
as a matter of formal representation 33 ° or as a matter of ensuring
sufficient reserves to pay latent claims. 33 1 Where solvency allows the
firm to internalize future costs, creative governance mechanisms have
salvaged some settlement class actions, even in sweeping mass
torts. 332 Where such internalization is not possible, as in asbestos, the
picture is decidedly less rosy.
How the mass tort settlement class will ultimately be managed
is beyond the scope of this Article. The historical record from the last
century of practice in the area of mature torts, however, powerfully
suggests that it will not be on the basis of individual claimants,
individually represented, seeking their day in court. As Richard
Nagareda aptly summarizes the world of the mature, mass harms in
aggregated proceedings: "Transactions, not trials are overwhelmingly
the endgame of class lawsuits." 33 3 And in many ways, this is a good
thing, too, for reasons of both administrative efficiency and intra-class
equity.
Although for the most part we have focused on the institutional
efficiencies that propel aggregate settlement, we would be remiss if we
did not also address gains in equity that emerge from aggregation. To
return to Frederick Schauer's recent reminder, many seemingly
individualized assessments of risk and responsibility are crude
renditions of probabilistic reasoning. 3 4 Tort law adopts probabilistic
methods either covertly in the probabilistic factual determinations
that juries must make or overtly in cases that turn on epidemiological
or otherwise statistical proofs.
Unfortunately, as a statistical matter, the probabilistic
accounts that undergird much of tort law translate poorly down to a
330. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627-29 (1997) (discussing inherent
conflicts between current and future victims of asbestos-related disease and the need for
separate representation).
331. See, for example, the miscalculation in the Manville Trust and the diminution from
paying 100 percent of assessed claim value to paying 5 percent. For an analysis of Amchem and
Ortiz focusing on the futures issue as the critical failing in the proposed settlements, see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901-15 (2000).
332. See Nagareda, supra note 117, at 820-21.
333. Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV.
287, 289 (2003).
334. See SCHAUER, supra note 33, at 103-05.
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sample size of only one individual case. In any individual trial, the
plaintiff will either win or lose. In turn, the plaintiff will claim fully
compensatory damages in case of victory and get nothing in case of
defeat. This leaves similarly situated individuals at risk of
dramatically different results depending on the lottery effect of
whether they find themselves on the fortunate side of the draw. By
contrast, aggregate settlements are often able, like workers'
compensation and administrative systems, to smooth the probabilities
across the range of similarly situated claimants. 335 Thus, if judgment
to trial of all similar cases would result (at great expense) in plaintiffs
winning 60 percent of the time and receiving zero the other 40
percent, a mature settlement system will often allow settlements
across a wide range of claimants at 60 percent of what a judgment
would render. The system gains not only the efficiency of lower
transaction costs, but the equitable treatment of similarly situated
claimants spared from the litigation lottery.
IV. CONCLUSION

The term "inevitability" in the title of this Article is intended to
provoke controversy. What would it mean to say that the world of tort
compensation for mature injuries "inevitably" devolves into a system
of private resolution relatively immune from public oversight? Our
claim is not that this is the only system that could emerge, or even
that it is necessarily the best system for compensating the victims of
mass society. Indeed, one need only look to the public compensation
systems in Western Europe or New Zealand to imagine a different set
of institutions for injury compensation.3 3 6 One could also readily
imagine a legal system premised on litigation that would nonetheless
adopt more thoroughgoing controls over private settlement markets.
The great irony then is that aggregated settlements are inevitable in a
system committed to litigant autonomy. Mass settlement structures
emerge out of the play of precisely the private interests to which
American tort law claims allegiance.
In some ways this ought not be especially surprising. Tort law,
after all, emerged as a distinct branch of municipal law in the era of

335. Schuck, supra note 27, at 959 (stating that "[t]he mass tort system increasingly
generates predictable claim values for particular torts").
336. See generally P.R. KAIM-CAUDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL SECURITY: A

TEN-COUNTRY STUDY 290-312 (1973); G. Palmer, New Zealand'sAccident Compensation Scheme:
Twenty Years On, 44 U. TORONTO L. REV. 22 (1994); G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY:
A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979).
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mass industrialization.3 37 It would be odd if the very industrialization
processes that generated a crisis for Victorian individualism had in
turn also brought into being a peculiarly individualized field of legal
practice.
Why, then, are the myths of individuation and the day-in-court
ideal so persistent? One possible explanation is that the world of
privatized aggregation and settlement we have described here exists
outside of the universe of legal materials from which torts jurists have
traditionally drawn their descriptions of the law of torts. Aggregated
settlement happens virtually unseen and unobserved in the deepest
shadows of the law of torts. Indeed, in this sense the publicly imposed
closure provided by the class action device in cases such as Amchem
and Ortiz would have played the salutary function of imposing some
transparency on a world that is otherwise largely immune from
scrutiny.
Another possible explanation may be, paradoxically, the selling
of corrective justice by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' and defense bar
alike. It is striking that much of the evidence that can be gleaned
about nineteenth and early twentieth century aggregation is to be
found in cases on lawyer discipline: 33 8 constituencies within the bar
have had a vested interest in the day-in-court myth because it
obstructs transaction-cost-minimizing reform.3 39 A combination of
institutional conservatism and self-interest has therefore often united
the defense and plaintiffs' bars in defeating efforts to replace the tort
system with alternative arrangements, including comprehensive
administrative measures such as auto no-fault systems.3 40 These
same impulses may explain some of the resistance to formal
recognition of how aggregation has fundamentally reshaped the
practice of American tort law. Once we bring into view the
institutional dynamics of aggregation in private settlement markets,
however, it is difficult to view uncritically the ways in which the bar
has championed the "moral and ethical foundations" 341 of tort, the
337. See Grey, supra note 38.
338. See supra notes 129-33 & 141-42; see also Raymond N. Caverly, What Constitutes
Practice of Law, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty Ed.), May 1938, at 7 (describing "the
adjustment and settlement of claims" by non-lawyers as "the unauthorized practice of law")
339. E.g., John Alan Appleman, Jury Verdicts and Insurance Rates, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire
& Casualty Ed.), Oct. 1962, at 53 (insurance industry article defending the civil jury)
340. E.g., Edward C. Stone, Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance, 27 BEST'S INS.
NEWS (Causalty, Surety & Misc. Ed.), Feb. 1927, at 283-284, 286 (arguing against auto no-fault
laws); Guy E. Mann, Compensating Auto Accident Victims, BEST'S INS. NEWS (Fire & Casualty
Ed.), Dec. 1965, at 14 (same). See generally WITT, supra note 16, at 194-96 (describing the
opposition of the bar to no-fault compensation systems for automobile accidents in the 1930s);
Simon, supra note 154, at 528 (same).
341. What Does the FutureHold?, 1 FOR THE DEF. 9, 10 (1960).
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"moral principle" 342 of fault, and the significance of "preserv[ing] and
maintain[ing] the very institution of trial practice itself."343 It is
particularly difficult to accept these arguments when they are raised
as dispositive defenses against public compensation systems, even as
proponents know full well that in practice the tort system looks much
like the compensation regimes against which it is so often arrayed.
Our focus on the institutional dimension of the tort system is
not intended as advocacy for any particular model of how courts
should decide any individual tort case. Indeed, limitations on the
institutional competence of tort judges to manage the far-flung system
of private settlement suggest that courts may be best advised to decide
individual cases by reference to long-standing, traditional tort
standards, without regard to the private settlement institutions that
will emerge in their shadow. Our claim, however, is that this aspect of
tort is at best partial. Torts jurists in the law schools and in the courts
have for the most part either ignored, missed the significance of, or
maybe even been unaware of, the practices that animate the
resolution of large swaths of mature tort claims. All too often, the
consequence has been a misleading description of our torts practices
and a misleading account of the distinctive features of mass tort class
actions.
Following the von Clausewitz-inspired idea of a leading claims
adjuster from the middle of the twentieth century, we might even say
that "adjusting stands in the same relation to law as politics to the art
of war. '344 Aggregate claims settlement practices are tort law by other
means.

342. Justice in Court After the Accident, 9 FOR THE DEF. 9, 11 (1968).
343. Coordinationof Defense Publications,4 FOR THE DEF. 14, 14 (1963).
344. JOHNS, supra note 182, at 395.

